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This thesis follows the history of the German SPD from its founding in 1871 to its 
ideological break with Marxism and reconceptualization as a mass party in 1959. I rely 
on three approaches to explain the positions that the party took in their party programs on 
the reconciliation between capitalism and democracy. The ideational approach is 
concerned with the role of ideas in party position taking. The Organizational approach 
focuses on internal dynamics of the party, its leadership, competing factions and 
membership. The positional approach draws inspiration from Downsian models of party 
competition where parties compete to be positioned closest to the majority of voters in 
policy space. For my purposes I split German history into three periods, the German 
Empire (1871-1913), the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) and the Federal Republic (1945-
1959). I find that each of the approaches can help explain the positions taken by the SPD 
at different times in German history 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 1875 in the small city of Gotha, located in the center of the German Empire, a 
small group of politically motivated citizens came together at the founding congress of 
the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Spurred by a desire to unite the two 
dominant political organizations of the working class, the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei 
Deutschlands (SAPD) and the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter Verein (ADAV), 
delegates debated issues concerning the project of working class liberation. Deeply aware 
of the unequal distribution of the fruits of the dominant economic system, the prospects 
of working class politics looked dire. The only hope laid in the members of the working 
class themselves against which all other classes merely constituted a “reactionary mass” 
(Gotha Program 1875). This sentiment is enshrined in the founding document of this 
congress, the Gotha Program. In this Program the party staked out its positions on 
understandings of, and the proper relationship between, democracy and socialism that 
would constitute the core of leftist politics in Germany for nearly one hundred years.  
Eighty-four years later, in 1959, in a small town outside of Bonn, the recently 
established capital of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), members of the SPD met 
to discuss the future of their party. Historically the representative party of the Left in 
German political competition, the SPD had met numerous times since Gotha to discuss 
revisions of their Grundsatzprogramm, the party’s Manifesto. This latest meeting was 
held following three elections under the rules of the new Basic Law.  
The Manifesto that the party agreed upon at the 1959 party congress, named the 




significantly from earlier programs. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and under 
pressure from both the recently departed allies and the German voters, the Social 
Democrats completed their evolution away from the Marxist roots of the Gotha Program. 
Its class-based politics fared poorly in the post-war and cold war political-economic 
context. The change in positions from Gotha to Bad Godesberg coincides with a change 
in the party from a focus on class-based electoral organization to an electoral machine 
concerned first and foremost with votes. As a way of ensuring this, instead of 
categorizing all other classes as reactionary in the Godesberg Program the party makes 
peace with other classes and even attempts to make inroads with employers and other 
elites. This updated Program reflects not just its working out of a tension between 
democracy and socialism, but a final settlement with capitalism.  
While a cursory glance at the two programs independent of their political 
economic context shows a difference, the question remains, why did the party change? 
Even embedded in the context of German political history, the differences in positioning 
by German parties cannot be simply explained as a reflection of the current political 
moment. The SPD’s history as the oldest and largest of the leftist parties in Germany is 
full of programmatic renewals. Under each new political system, from the German 
Empire (1871-1914) to the parliamentary democracy of the Weimar Republic (1918-
1933) and the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-), the party produced two distinct 
Grundsatzprogramme. Sometimes it took decades to construct a new program with only a 
few key changes; at other times the second manifesto was ratified within a few years of 
the first and shifted the party in an entirely new direction. As the German party with the 




though the German polity exists in its fourth iteration. In order to remain a viable political 
organization, the SPD was forced to alter some of its positions on key issues concerning 
capitalism and democracy. The SPD offers a fascinating window onto party change 
amidst sharply different political economic circumstances.  
This thesis addresses questions of party competition in distinct polities. In order to 
understand any political system, we must understand the actors within the system. 
Political parties as strategic actors have been studied widely and in a variety of different 
ways (Müller and Strøm 1999, Kitschelt 1994). This thesis explores issues ranging from 
party motivations to interactions with voters, and how these changes reflect different 
political economic contexts. These analyses are linked to another core issue taken up in 
this thesis, namely the relationship between democracy and capitalism. Leftist parties are 
uniquely positioned to be interrogated in search of an answer to these questions. 
Historically, class has been the key issue for parties operating on the left of the 
ideological spectrum. Additionally these parties discuss the degree to which the state 
should regulate—or whether to allow at all—the operation of capitalism. This thesis asks 
the question why? Why do parties alter their commitments to these core issues? Taking a 
historical perspective, it furthermore asks how German leftist parties, and the SPD in 
particular, has altered its commitments. 
In this thesis I will examine the positions that the SPD has taken on the 
transformation of capitalism over 84 years, in three distinct polities, and various political 
economic contexts. In doing so I will compare the relative explanatory power of three 
dominant approaches to party position-taking. I find that an ideational analysis both 




organizational and spatial approaches best account for the SPD’s public commitments 
during the chaotic Weimar Republic. The devastation of the Nazi dictatorship and its 
aftermath established a new order for political competition in post-1945 Germany. An 
organizational account best explains the SPD’s growing failure to adapt to changing 
circumstances and organizational changes eventually allowed the party to respond to 
electoral pressures by evolving into a catch-all party now fully reconciled to sanding 
capitalism’s rough edges, rather than destroying it. In the remainder of this chapter I 
introduce the reader to my objects of inquiry, the literature concerning party position-
taking and my research methods. 
Party Platforms, Manifestos or Programs 
In order to answer the questions posed above, namely why do party commitment 
change, I look at party programs. I understand party programs to be the equivalent to 
party platforms and party manifestos. Programs are the collectively agreed-upon 
principles and policies of a party and combine the theoretical and practical dimensions of 
politics (Borg 1966: 97). Political competition, ideology and party organization 
contribute to the content of these documents due to the strategic elements of program 
formulation. Indeed, “changes from one platform to the next reflect deliberate decisions 
of the party to alter that identity” (Harmel and Svasand 1997: 321). Consequently, 
changes in the nature of party manifestos’ can have numerous possible explanations.  
In essence, these documents outline the particular principles that specific parties 
organize and campaign around. Due largely to shorter campaign cycles, the US electoral 
system places comparatively minor importance on the commitments made in party 
platforms. Most European systems, however, center on party platforms as the primary 




greater impact (Mudde, 2002). Written in German, most of these party platforms are 
inaccessible to American political scientists and only a few scholars have conducted close 
readings of them. Even in Germany these programs have rarely been analyzed in light of 
party theory. I will address this lacuna and study these programs from the party’s 
organization in the era of rapid industrialization in 1875 to the post World War Two era. 
Following a sustained period of increased economic prosperity, the German left broke 
with its past in 1959 to reconcile itself to a vision of politics that was no longer based on 
zero-sum competition between classes.  
My research draws on a number of useful, authoritative studies that trace the 
programmatic history of the SPD. Some of these works follow the programs from the 
party’s beginnings to the contemporary period. Others focus on a distinct period of time 
and analyze the change from one program to another. Many such studies have been 
published only in German and offer historical narratives rather than seeking to provide a 
social scientific explanation for these changes (Winkler 1982; Münkel 2007).  
For example, Heinrich August Winkler (1982) traces the change in the SPD 
Grundsatzprogramme during the Weimar Republic. He focuses on the Görlitz Program of 
1921, the first SPD Grundsatzprogramm after WWI, and specifically the internal party 
debate on the inclusion of non working-class members in the party’s electoral base. 
Winkler is uniquely attuned to the complex relationship between the party’s ideology and 
its organization. His study draws on party literature other than the programs themselves 
to substantiate his claims concerning the process of program ratification. Though he pays 
careful attention to the socio-political climate during the Weimar Republic and attributes 




organizational, he does not classify his approach in these terms. Rather, Winkler 
investigates the party’s actions at a certain moment in time and analyzes the program in 
order to discuss the classification of the SPD as a class or mass party (Winkler, 1982).  
Münkel (2007) provides a more complete overview of the programmatic history 
of the SPD, but sacrifices a close look at the internal politics of positional change in favor 
of a broad description of programmatic commitments. Both Münkel and Winkler 
implicitly and explicitly discuss the role of ideas on the party, and both trace an 
organizational shift in the party throughout the early twentieth century. Yet the spatial 
model of party competition, so central to political scientists, receives little to no attention 
in either of these studies. While relevant studies exist in English, most are either general 
histories of the Left in Europe (Eley 2002) or offer surveys of the SPD, touching on 
programmatic shifts without analyzing language in any detail (Wilson, 1989; Katz and 
Mair, 1992; Harmel and Janda, 1994). 
The SPD 
I focus on the German Social Democratic Party, the SPD. Since its founding in 1875, the 
party has served as the standard for other European social democratic parties (Sassoon 
1996). Many of the leading Marxist theorists—other than Karl Marx himself and his 
closest collaborator Friedrich Engels—were affiliated with the German SPD. Indeed, the 
party had the second-highest electoral success in Europe prior to the outbreak of the First 
World War, and had over four times as many members as the second largest social 
democratic party during that time (Eley 2002: Table 4.2). In addition to its international 
importance, the SPD has been the largest party on the left in Germany since its founding. 
Though other parties competed with the SPD for socialist voters these parties had little 




the Communist Party (KPD) during Weimar, did achieve electoral victories, they are less 
interesting to study in terms of position taking on the issues of capitalism and democracy. 
This is due to their relatively clear, unwavering positions on such issues. The KPD, for 
example, never strayed from its distinct anti-capitalist stance and opposition to the 
foundation of liberal democracy the Republic. The relative importance of the SPD in 
German and European politics, coupled with the party’s resilience in the face of political 
change and continued development of its positions on the transformation of the capitalist 
system, make it a unique party worth taking a closer look at, both in terms of 
understanding better the dynamics of socialism amidst democracy and in terms of 
understanding party position change more broadly. 
Literature Review 
 
Scholars of political parties have drawn on several competing approaches when seeking 
to explain why and how parties change their position taking or commitments. I have 
identified three prominent strains in this literature. The spatial approach is rooted in 
economic theory applied to political parties. This approach explains party position taking 
relative to other electorally competitive parties. Second, the organizational approach 
focuses on the individual parts of the party and explains changes in positions by focusing 
on internal changes in who is empowered to determine the party’s public issue positions 
and ideological components. Finally, the ideational approach describes changes in party 
doctrine in terms of the independent causal impact of ideas as they swirl in and about 
parties. Disagreements among the various approaches reflect different views on the 




The dominant motivations for political parties are found in the title of Strøm and 
Müller’s Policy, Office, or Votes (1999). Each realm, policy, office, or vote, places an 
emphasis on a particular motivation. If one believes capturing the most votes is the 
primary motivation of any party, a spatial approach lends itself well to further analysis. 
However, if the goal of a party is to enact policy, it may not need to capture the most 
votes to enter in a governing coalition. In this case, ideas about policy might best explain 
position taking, especially of smaller coalition parties. Some of these explanations may 
be more convincing in certain periods than others. Keeping in mind historical 
fluctuations, I contend that any monocausal account will fall short of explaining the 
complexity and variability of party position taking. My thesis thus does not advance any 
single explanation, but seeks to identify which forces are most powerful at a given time. 
However, I must first justify their usefulness in tracing leftist parties’ commitments.  
Spatial Model of Party Competition 
The literature on spatial party competition in political science is extensive. Though the 
first applications of a simple one-dimensional spatial model came from economics 
(Hotelling 1929), and Downs promoted its application to political processes in his 1957 
classic, An Economic Theory of Democracy. In his treatise, Downs places political actors 
on a left-right ideological scale in order to make predictions about party position taking 
on certain left-right issues (Downs 1957). Researchers continue to rely on a on a one- or 
two-dimensional spectrum to understand party competition and position taking. However, 
the versatility of this model derives from its simplicity, which also limits the applicability 
of the model when it comes to discussing the complex relationships of parties to their 




The main assumptions of this type of inquiry are two-fold. First, the spatial model 
of relies on the assumption that winning elections is the primary motivating force of 
political parties. Additionally, it assumes party elites can “move” wherever they like in an 
unconstrained manner. Together these two assumptions lead to the prediction that all 
party position taking is relative given the competition. Positions are solely instrumental, 
and are changed in order to capture a larger segment of the electorate. Numerous 
critiques have been leveled against the real applicability of the model to explain party 
position taking. 
Most important, political scientists have critiqued the presupposition that parties 
exist in a one-dimensional space (Stokes 1963; Pelizzo 2003). Left-right ideology, even 
along class lines, is simply not sufficient to explain the competition of political parties in 
modern democracies. Religious conflict, urban-rural splits, and regional differences are 
evident in nearly every modern democracy (Rokkan and Lipset 1967). Scholars also 
dispute other assumptions of the model for oversimplifying the complex interactions 
between political parties. 
Still, the spatial logic of party competition is persuasive and indispensible, even if 
it cannot explain all party behavior. Within any party system that includes two or more 
parties, the strategies of other parties will affect the actions of each player in the electoral 
game. On any individual issue, a party is constrained by the positions staked out by other 
parties. If an issue is less important for a given party than to other parties, the individual 
party may have more freedom in expressing its positions. However, as soon as it stakes 
out a position, it becomes vulnerable to competing positions encroaching on the votes 




Organizational Model of Party Competition 
The second body of theorizing party position taking emphasizes the party’s 
organizational features. In contrast to the flexible view of party position taking 
emphasized by the spatial approach, this organizational approach understands parties as 
complex bodies often resistant to rapid transformations. Like most collective actors, 
parties face organizational constraints that affect the expression of shared beliefs. Who 
controls the party, who drafts the party’s positions, and what factions exist within the 
party membership affect the outcomes of internal deliberations. Because position taking 
is thus often highly constrained by internal features. 
Many scholars distinguish parties by placing them within neat groups that reflect 
the core constituents of the party (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Duverger 1954; Kircheimer 
1966). Differing party motivations as well as different views on the structure of society 
manifest themselves in unique organizational structures. A focus on a single issue or a 
single group of voters requires different organization than a mass party. Parties at 
different points in time may also have different organizational features reflecting the 
evolution of that party.  According to this literature such features are the key to 
differentiating one type from another.  
The attention to the relationship between civil society and the party at large can 
obfuscate some of the more complex interactions of party organizations. Katz and Mair 
(1994) attempt to disaggregate organization in terms of the party, “on the ground,” “in 
public office,” and “in central office” (Katz and Mair 1994: 4). Party manifestos offer 
insight into the workings of the “party in central office…which, at least in the traditional 
mass-party model, organizes and is usually representative of the party on the ground” 




change. According to them, parties change due to “leadership change, a change in the 
dominant faction of the party, and/or an external stimulus for change” (Harmel and Janda 
1994: 1).  
Ideational Model of Party Competition 
The final family of explanations of party position-taking emphasizes the independent 
effects of ideas in politics. Here, the broad system of beliefs and ideas that guide party 
politics constrain possible commitments. Ideology is more than just the actual 
organizational manifestations of certain ideas within the party itself. While an underlying 
ideology can have a marked effect on the organization of the party, the work of ideology 
does not stop here. Ideational theorists (Hall 2003; Berman 1998) stress the independence 
of ideas from actual political organization, and have formulated ways to discuss ideas as 
independent variables. Ideology is one of the bases of party formation, and can be a 
dynamic characteristic of parties that affects both what the party organ can and cannot 
say about certain topics. 
There is a large body of literature concerning ideas but I draw on a few authors to 
illustrate how I intend to treat the power of ideas. For example, Sheri Berman (1998) 
views ideas as independent phenomena to be studied separately form parties and their 
political institutions. In The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making 
of Interwar Europe (1998), she studies ideas and politics of Social Democratic parties in 
the interwar period (1917-1933). For Germany this is one of the most important periods 
in which a thicket of opposing ideas within parties leads to splits and fragmentation. 
Consequently, it is challenging to make sense of the political landscape. Berman begins 
her account in the foundational years of social democracy in 19th century Germany to 




Republic. She distinguishes between ideology and programmatic beliefs, arguing that the 
latter, while abstract and systematic, differ from the former in that they do not amount to 
a “total vision of the world.” The programmatic beliefs provide guidelines for programs 
of concrete action (Berman 1998: 21). Berman shows how ideas shape the resulting 
organizational and institutional structures of the social democratic parties in Germany 
and Sweden.  
Berman’s analysis is important for my project, as she explains party position 
taking with reference to the ideas embedded in party institutions and structure. According 
to Berman, the ideas of the parties at their beginnings are institutionalized in such a way 
that they affect both the development of parties internally (i.e. organizationally) and how 
they respond to challenges such as economic crises and electoral defeats. In tracing how 
the interests of the SPD in Germany develop, she emphasizes how ideational 
commitments filter party leaders’ perceptions of both the problems they wish to address 
and the solutions they propose. If parties are relatively fixed ideologically, they must 
develop other mechanisms to react to new electoral environments. Ideas concerning the 
appropriate focus of the party are an example of this type of reactive movement.  
Research Design and Methods 
As mentioned above, this study seeks to explain the complex history of the SPD 
by drawing on three broad theories of party position taking: ideational, organizational, 
and spatial. As I provide a brief overview of these preceding sections I will focus on my 
use of these theories here. In testing these approaches it is unlikely that any monocausal, 
“one-size-fits-all” story can account for the complexity and variation of such positions 
across time. Additionally, these positions are not taken in a vacuum; political-economic 




this context also change over time.  Thus, while my empirical contribution will rest 
entirely on my collection and analysis of party documents, my explanatory contribution 
necessarily requires understanding how other major parties position themselves relative 
to the SPD. 
Periodization 
Part of my method includes an admittedly German attempt to impose order on the 
turbulent history of the German nation-state. As such, my periodization is as much a part 
of my method as the interpretive tools I use to understand the party programs. Since I am 
concerned with the German Left’s position taking on the relationship between capitalism 
and democracy, I begin with the first calls for democracy by social democrats in the late 
nineteenth century, and end with the reconciliation of democracy and capitalism at the 
end of the 1950s. 
Given the historical transformations and flux of the German political system from 
the period of rapid industrialization at the founding of the German Empire in 1871 to the 
SPD’s break with Marxism and publishing of the Godesberg Program in 1959, this study 
must contend with a series of momentous political shifts. In order to structure the inquiry 
across time, I focus on three distinct political periods: the Founding period (1871-1914), 
the Weimar period (1918-1933), and the period of the founding years of the Federal 
Republic (West Germany from 1945-1959. Since I am studying political parties of the 
Left, I will not be looking at the period of Nazi dictatorship from 1933-1945, when 
opposition parties were banned. I am also excluding from consideration the one-party, 
authoritarian regime in East Germany (1945-1989).  
During these periods, parties such as the SPD, which existed in some form under 




to unique political economic contexts. In each of the periods that I have studied different 
political rules of the game existed. The national boundaries of Germany were redrawn 
following both world wars, affecting who voted in elections. Furthermore, suffrage was 
expanded following the First World War, again affecting who could vote in German 
federal elections. The electoral system itself changed from one nested in a monarchical 
system to an expansive democracy during Weimar to a curtailed version of the Weimar 
system after World War Two. Though German history has been marked by momentous 
changes in political systems, parties often exhibit surprising continuities over time 
(Geddes 1995; Grzymala-Busse 2003).  
The Left 
My focus on the left is a deliberate choice given my interest in party position 
taking on the tensions between democracy and capitalism. Especially with regard to 
redistribution, left parties stand to gain more from promoting these types of structural 
reforms of the political economy. This is in part due to the constituents of left parties 
(Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Typically, the core bloc of voters for left parties stand to 
gain more from redistribution due to their position in the lower half of the income 
distribution (Meltzer and Richards 1981). Furthermore, the European left has strong 
historical ties to socialism, specifically the type of democratic socialism promoted by 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels during the 19th century. In Marx’s view, the material 
relations of production constituted the base of society. Thus, the various Internationals’ 
commitment to social democratic parties was inherently concerned with the political-
economic relations of their respective countries. As a result of a commitment to socialism 
and redistributive policies in particular, leftist parties have a strategic interest in having 




should also advocate for definite solutions to these problems, and therefore are an 
interesting family of parties to examine at in order to analyze political discourse. 
In fact, the German left is of particular interest in this manner due to its clear 
answer to the question of whether to reconcile itself to capitalist democracy expressed in 
the Bad Godesberg Program of 1959. Up to this time the party had to balance on the tight 
rope between capitalism and democracy. Following the publication of the Godesberg 
Program, the question was settled and the party affirmed its support of the system by 
reorganizing itself as a party “for the people” rather than only the workers (SPD 1959). 
Evidence 
Evidence of party positions comes from their programs. In Germany, parties have 
long provided two types of public documents to voters: Grundsatzprogramme (basic 
programs) and Wahlprogramme (electoral programs). As the name suggests, the 
Grundsatzprogramm is the document that “sets out the basic values of the party” 
(Inoguchi and Blondel 2012). Texts of this genre consequently contain a picture of the 
party’s ideology at the time of publication. The Wahlprogramme, by contrast, articulate 
the commitments parties make during specific electoral contests. Throughout German 
political history parties have published different Grundsatzprogramme, but much less 
frequently than the number of elections in which they fielded candidates and formulate 
Wahlprogramme. 
Different approaches to analyzing political texts exist (Winkler 1982; Budge 
2001; Mudde 2002; Laver and Benoit 2006). However, many of these methods are 
uniquely suited for cross-national studies as they strive to render different parties’ 
programs directly comparable. As a study of a single country my study requires a more 




In order to analyze the position taking in light of the theories discussed above, simple 
word counts or even sentence-level coding is of little use. Instead, I place the manifestos 
of leftist parties in their respective contexts, both historical and textual, and then discuss 
the possible explanations for why they include certain statements, or at least what may 
have influenced the decision-making process leading to these statements. While these 
programs constitute my main source of party positions, I also rely on secondary sources 
to aid in interpretation and contextualization. Thus, my focus rests on qualitative textual 
analysis methods to discuss “specific content and histories” (Gerring 1998: 288) as a way 
of understanding the public commitments parties make regarding democracy and 
capitalism. 
For the purposes of my inquiry I look at numerous programs mostly from parties 
on the Left in Germany. Since the SPD occupies such a prominent position in my 
research it is also the most heavily represented in terms of manifesto data. The data is 
primarily gathered from Grundsatz programs. The SPD, from 1875-1959, published five 
basic programs all named after their place of conception: Gotha (1875), Erfurt (1891), 
Görlitz (1921), Heidelberg (1924) and Bad Godesberg (1959).  
In the summer of 2016, thanks in large part to the contributions from the Gerstein 
Award, I was able to travel to Bonn and visit the party foundations of the SPD and CDU. 
During my visits I had the opportunity to read through primary documents the party 
archives, including numerous of the programs mentioned above. In order to substantiate 
my arguments concerning SPD position taking during Weimar, amidst a proliferation of 
leftist parties, I look at Grundsatz Programs from the Independent Social Democratic 




I also examine Wahlprogramme from the SPD and its main electoral competitor, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Over this period the German population voted in 
three federal elections 1949, 1953 and 1957. Thus I assess a total of 6 electoral programs 
from this period. 
 
Summary of Findings 
The thesis follows a chronological structure. I devote a chapter to each of the 
periods defined above. As I argue, in most cases, two competing explanations are the 
most likely candidates in accounting for party position taking in a particular period, and 
so each chapter strives to demonstrate which is the more powerful for that era. Each 
chapter begins by introducing the political-economic context, then describes the relevant 
parties’ efforts to make public claims about the relationship between the state and 
capitalism, and closes with an effort to explain party programs.  
 Chapter 2 covers the founding era (1871-1914), a period of intense 
industrialization, the expansion of Germany’s borders, fledgling working-class 
organization, and—most important--the great consolidation of power by a central state. 
Two parties--the ADAV and the SDAP--take center stage. Four years after the unification 
of the German Reich, they came together to form the direct precursor of the SPD, the 
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAPD). Through a close analysis of the 
Gotha Program (1875) and the Erfurt Program (1891) I find that an ideational account 
best explains these programs, which concern the relationship between the state, its 
citizens, and capitalism. While Gotha functioned as a unifying document, the Erfurt 




 Chapter 3 tackles the heady, complex, and ultimately tragic Weimar period (1918-
1933), from the establishment of parliamentary democracy after the war until Hitler’s rise 
to power. The turbulent period of democratization following the abdication of the Kaiser 
and establishment of a People’s Council tasked with drafting the new German 
constitution was a time of massive and fast-paced political upheaval. Due to the 
complexities of the period, I divide it into two sub-periods of party competition. Intense 
political organizing as well as social and economic instability mark the first five years, 
from 1918-1923. During this time, the SPD struggled to establish itself in the new 
republic it demanded in the years preceding the war. Although the party made real gains 
in terms of worker protections, it faced a challenging electoral context that included 
numerous competitors opposed to parliamentary democracy. Thus, I examine the 
position-taking of two new parties, the Communist party (KPD) and the Independent 
Social Democratic Party (USPD) as well as that of the SPD. I describe the public 
commitments of these major leftist parties in order to buttress my organizational 
explanation of SPD statements regarding how democracy and capitalism might be 
reconciled. 
 The second sub-period in chapter 3 ranges from 1924-1929. This is a period of 
relative political and economic stability up until the economic crash of 1929. After 
attempting to deal with the mounting organizational fissures apparent in party 
membership during Weimar’s first five years, SPD decision-making was dominated by 
electoral concerns. In competition with the KPD for the left-most voters of the working 
class, the SPD was forced to reassess its positions taken in the Görlitz Program (1921) 




capitalism and democracy is best explained with reference to a spatial analysis of the 
electoral battle between SPD and KPD. 
 Just as chapters 2 and 3 are divided by a war, so too are chapters 3 and 4. The 
Second World War had a devastating effect on Germany. The allied victors, fearful of a 
resurgence of National Socialism, occupied the German territories from 1945 to 1955. 
During this time, the Allies in the West helped western Germany reestablish itself as a 
capitalist democracy. Politicians drafted a new Basic Law meant to protect democracy 
against the anti-democratic parties that plagued the Weimar Republic’s party system. 
Two major parties competed for office during this time, the SPD and the more 
conservative Christian Democratic Union. I explain the positions of the SPD in terms of 
its internal organization. Under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher the party maintained 
its course of opposition to the capitalist system. After his death it took another seven 
years for the party to complete its evolution from class-based party to catch-all party. 
 Chapter 5 provides a brief overview of some of the markers of German social 
democratic policy following the adoption of the Bad Godesberg Program. The 
transformative effects of the reconceptualization of party identity manifested in this 
program, as well as distinctive political-economic features aided the SPD in attaining 
governmental power. During the 60s the party promoted reforms to the welfare and tax 
system that increased the material welfare of the German working class. I also provide a 
summary of my findings as well as some next steps future researchers might take.
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Chapter 2: The Founding Period (1917-1914) 
 
The SPD was born in 1875 at a congress in the small town of Gotha in Thuringia. 
After the unification of the German empire in 1871, the two representatives of working 
class interests in the, up to this point independent, lands of Germany set aside some of 
their differences and met to draft their own unifying document, the Gotha program 
(Potthoff and Miller 2006: 38-41). This chapter discusses the positions of the SPD in the 
Gotha program as well as those taken in the Erfurt Program of 1891.  
I discuss the period’s two Grundsatzprogramme in chronological sequence. The 
Gotha Program of 1875 may be regarded as the founding document of the party. Though 
it was penned by the leading voice of popular Marxism in Europe, Karl Kautsky, it does 
not yet fully reflect his dominant strain of Marxian ideas. My analysis of the program’s 
language and the inconsistency of the ideas it expresses serves as the basis for my 
argument that, while organizational pressure drove the party unification process the 
compromise is based in Marxist propositions concerning the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism. I argue that the organizational approach to party position 
taking does help to explain the program’s lack of emphasis on these very ideas though 
they exerted a force evident in the second program of this era, the Erfurt Program.  
The organizational approach focuses on internal party dynamics. These dynamics 
were certainly important during the time in which the ADAV and the SDAP came 
together to form a new, unified party. Especially given the differences in the sizes of the 
two parties’ membership base one faction may have had more power in the ratification 




unification of the German empire and the dismal electoral results of each party alone in 
the early elections made the joining of the two parties mutually beneficial. Since the 
parties were already on the path to merge their organizational structures the content of the 
program did not necessarily need to appease one side over the other. I therefore argue that 
the organizational approach is of secondary importance in explaining the position taking 
in Gotha and especially Erfurt. The positions taken by the SPD in these programs is better 
explained in ideational terms.  
Based on my analysis of the party’s second Grundsatzprogramm, formulated in 
Erfurt in 1891 I contend that Marxist ideas concerning the relationship of the worker to 
the dominant political system do the most work in explaining the positions of the German 
Left on the issue of the relationship between democracy and capitalism at this early 
period in the movements political history. Compared to the Gotha Program, the Erfurt 
Program and subsequent discussions inside the SPD show a marked increase of attention 
to the relationship between capitalism and democracy as a political issue to be 
highlighted in programmatic doctrines. 
First, I provide a brief overview of the political and economic environment in 
which the party formed. This allows me to situate the SPD’s two major programs of this 
period in a historical context. Then I introduce the party’s predecessors, the Allgemeiner 
deutscher Arbeiterverband (ADAV) and the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei 
Deutschlands (SDAP), to raise the question of why these two parties, different in their 
ideas about the state and the role of political parties in the class struggle but similar in 
their goals, came together to form one of the most successful socialist parties in Europe. 




positions taken in this program. I do the same for the Erfurt program. I conclude that the 
influence of Marxism tied the two parties together in a way that is evidently expressed in 
the first program of the party that would become today’s German SPD and reinforced 
after a period of state pressure in the party’s 1891 Erfurt Program.  
Marx and European Socialism 
The worker’s movement in Germany prior to unification in 1871 was a diffuse 
collection of organizations and ideas. Marxism had gradually come into being as a basis 
for political action. The second half of the 19th century was marked by rapid 
industrialization and changing class structure, a rise in the power of nationalism, 
numerous wars, and constantly shifting national borders. In addition to, and partly 
spurred by, the rapid transformation of the European geo-political landscape, the 1860s 
was a time of party organization and mass campaigns centered on the working class. The 
political potential of the working class was already evident to Marx. However, it was 
unclear how to use this perceived potential to transition from the status quo—industrial 
capitalism amidst a monarchy with limited political freedoms—to socialism. Though it 
would not be until after the First World War that Germany truly democratized, the late 
1860s brought a wave of popular enfranchisement that bolstered the fledgling social 
movement into a political force (Eley 2002). Even within the monarchies dominated 
European political systems, representative bodies for the population existed. In many 
cases suffrage was restricted to men over a specified age and parties in Germany mostly 
represented local constituencies or the landed elite. Against this backdrop workers’ 
associations were the first instance of working class organization. Though limited 
opportunities for attaining actual political power existed, these were mostly symbolic due 




monarchical systems in Europe, socialist parties began to provide an alternative to the 
traditional Liberal and Conservative parties.  
Marx’s activity in the First International and the ideology he expounded together 
with Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto set up the theoretical guidelines for 
the way socialist parties should constitute themselves and operate in political 
competition. Donald Sassoon (1996) distinguishes three features of 19th century European 
socialism based on Marx’s theory. One is the determinacy of the doctrine of historical 
materialism. According to this view, history moves in stages differentiated by specific 
economic systems. To each dominant, or current, economic system “corresponds a 
particular system of power and hence a specific ruling class” (Sasoon 1996: 6). 
Furthermore, Marx viewed capitalism, the dominant economic system of his time, as 
unjust. The formal equalities, of increased suffrage and worker protections that primarily 
the middle classes benefited from, gained in the revolutions of the late 1840s only 
functioned to legitimize the inequalities between worker and capitalist (Eley 2002: 47). 
However, the key for socialist party politics lay not in Marx’s critiques but was “the 
product of the idea and political practice of the leaders of European socialism (especially 
in Germany)” (Sasoon 1996: 6). These leaders, spurred by the ideas of Marxism, began to 
define workers as a homogeneous class that must strive towards real equality, which 
remained obfuscated by capitalism. They saw a democratic system as a fruitful arena for 
working class liberation given the growing number of working class citizens at the hands 
of the capitalist system.  
Based on these ideas, socialist parties began to spring up all over Europe with the 




of capitalism from its own contradictions (Eley 2002; Sasoon 1996). These parties 
worked towards a transitional state of participatory democracy that Marx believed to be 
the necessary political halfway house on the road to socialism (Brandt and Lehnert 2013). 
The German SPD was one of the first socialist parties to espouse a form of Marxist 
positions and became a model for new socialist parties across Europe to emulate (Sasoon 
1996). Prior to the model the SPD provided forms of socialism such as Chartism, 
Blanquism and utopian socialism had provided an ideological basis for socialist action 
across the continent (Eley 2002: 21-30). 
The German Empire 
In 1871, one imperial territory, three free cities, four kingdoms, five duchies, six 
grand duchies, and 7 principalities were unified into the first German Reich. Following 
the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War, the chancellor of the Northern German 
Confederation, Otto von Bismarck, proclaimed Wilhelm I of Prussia as Emperor of the 
German Reich. This event marked the beginning of a new political order in the German 
territories, which had previously been merely a loose confederation of states. Prussia, the 
largest duchy in the German Empire occupying much of what is Poland today, remained 
the most powerful player in the new order, as it controlled both the largest swathes of 
territory and the largest proportion of the population.  
The government of the newly unified German empire was set up as a federal 
constitutional monarchy. The King of Prussia was the Emperor and selected a 
Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor) who presided over the upper house of the German 
imperial government, the Bundesrat. State governments sent as many delegates as they 
were allotted according to the constitution to this chamber. The members of the 




families of the 25 German territories. The distribution of seats corresponded roughly to 
the size of the states population. As a result, Prussia dominated the Bundesrat, controlling 
17 of the 61 seats and effectively constituting nearly one-third of the votes in the 
chamber.  
The Reichstag, or lower house, more closely resembled the U.S. House of 
Representatives. All men over the age of 25 elected their representatives via direct secret 
ballots in single-member districts under a majority-voting rule. As a result, this chamber 
included representatives from various political parties. While the Reichstag played a role 
in drafting or proposing legislation, more often than not the Bundesrat decided on the 
legality of certain laws and even played a role in proposing legislation (Orlow 2008). 
Additionally, the Reichskanzler presided over the Bundesrat and cast the votes for the 
entire Prussian bloc.  Other voting rules further bolstered the power of the Bundesrat to 
maintain the rule of law in Germany. The privileged position of the Chancellor in the 
legislature meant that Prussia was the leading kingdom of Germany (Hayes 1916). 
 Prussia had a history of aristocratic rule rife with conservatism and militarism. 
Chancellor Bismarck exemplified these characteristics during his tenure from 1871 until 
Kaiser Wilhelm II released him from the position in 1890. Bismarck was the chief 
advocate of the new German constitution. This was essentially the same document he had 
ratified in Prussia during the years prior to unification (Orlow 2008). The constitution 
maximized his power, tied conservative authoritarianism with liberal economics, and 
actively curtailed the political power the emergence of new social groups along class or 




depression, for the most part he was heralded as “the great unifier” and credited with 
many of the successes of the founding period of the German empire (Orlow 2008). 
 The economic context of the early period of German history provided fertile soil 
for Marxist ideas to take root. As the economy shifted from agriculture to industry, the 
relative value of landed to liquid assets also changed (Ziblatt 2008). Job opportunities 
expanded during this period for almost all sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, the 
decades after unification were marked by numerous instances of economic turbulence. 
Already in 1872, immediately after the founding of the Reich, the economy was showing 
signs of overheating (Orlow 2008: 13-19). An influx of restitution paid by the French in 
the wake of the Franco-Prussian war had led to an increase in investment, which was 
followed by a severe depression in 1877/8. After a brief period of recovery, the empire 
languished in a depressed economic state for nearly the entire decade from 1880-1890 
(Orlow 2008: 13-19). 
In the face of the rising popularity of the socialist ideology, in 1878 Bismarck 
enacted a set of laws, referred to as the Sozialistengesetze (socialist laws), meant to 
curtail the power of the organizations that promoted it. After two assassination attempts 
on Emperor William I spread fear among the German populace, Bismarck stoked that 
fear in an attempt to snuff out the burgeoning socialist movement. The parliament voted 
overwhelmingly in support of the laws targeting socialism’s organization and 
proliferation in the German Empire (Orlow 2008: 29-32). Socialist organizations, 
associations, meetings, and news organs were banned under the law. The rationale was 
that the goal of these groups was to overthrow the existing state and therefore dangerous 




socialist ideology and could imprison and expel any suspicious persons and indeed they 
did (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 44). The law was extended three times over the course of 
the next decade and was only repealed after Bismarck’s resignation as chancellor in 1890. 
 During this time, the state played an increasing role in the daily lives of its 
subjects. As the government expanded so did its provision of social goods. Unions and 
trade associations also played a critical role in the lives of the working class and began to 
regulate the workers (Eley 2002). Additionally, with the rapid processes of 
industrialization city growth occurred at a steady pace. As workers lived in ever-closer 
quarters, they began to self-organize in the major urban centers across Europe. In 
Germany, this urban move towards the organization of the working class occurred at a 
rate that exceeded many other nations, and eventually led the SPD to become the largest 
socialist party in Europe by the outbreak of the First World War (Eley 2002). 
During this period, too, national governments expanded the franchise throughout the 
continent. Although in Germany the right to vote applied only in elections for the 
Reichstag, numerous political parties emerged to contest for representation. The ruling 
government immediately after unification was committed to the free market economy, 
low taxes and low levels of government regulation (Orlow 2008). The conservative ruling 
class that controlled the entire Bundesrat did not need to worry about losing their seats to 
new factions as their electorate consisted of the beneficiaries of the capitalist system; and 
yet, the competition at the party level in the Reichstag, while not immediately directly 
threatening the aristocracy’s position of power, sent a signal of the changing political 
climate after unification. Socialist and catholic parties joined the traditional conservative 




What had been simply a left-right regional split prior to unification now became a multi-
faceted political landscape in which urban and rural voters demanded new representative 
organs.  
These new parties slowly eroded the conservative monopoly on the votes from the 
agriculture, industry, and Prussian citizens. Rural peasants and the clergy left the 
Conservative party for parties they felt more closely aligned with their own ideas (Orlow 
2008). Eventually this shifting political landscape actually led to a split in both the 
Conservative and the Liberal party (Lehnert and Ebert 2015). In this increasingly 
fragmented electoral system the Center Party carved out a position as the voice for 
German Catholics. In this same environment the two major political organizations 
concerned with the plight of the working class, the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter 
Verein (ADAV; General German Workers’ Association) and the Sozialdemokratische 
Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SDAP; Social democratic Workers’ Party of Germany), had 
their own moment of unification. The parties joined in order to strengthen their political 
position as the representatives of Marxist ideas about the economy and, consequently, 
working class interests (Potthoff and Miller: 40). 
 In 1875, four years after the unification of the German Reich, delegates of the 
ADAV and SDAP met in Gotha, a small city in the state of Thuringia. At this congress, 
the parties discussed the future of the political representation of working class interests. 
Though both parties existed in some form in the 1860s, their political success was limited 
to isolated campaigns that resulted in little real political power (Eley 2002). 
 The combination of the ADAV and the SDAP into the SAPD was facilitated by 




support for the working class. Although they had previously been in competition, the two 
parties were able to make the compromises required to join into a single organization 
(Walter 2009) on the basis of Marxist ideas. In this case, ideational factors outweigh 
organizational concerns. Though the theoretical foundation of the Gotha Program is 
rooted in the theory of Karl Marx, it is not until the Erfurt Program that the party adopts 
















1871 30.1 9.3 23.0 18.6 3.2 - 15.8 50.7 
1874 29.7 9.0 14.1 27.9 6.8 - 12.4 60.8 
1877 27.2 8.5 17.6 24.8 9.1 - 10.1 60.3 
1881 14.7 23.1 23.7 23.2 6.1 - 9.1 56.1 
1884 17.6 19.3 22.1 22.6 9.7 - 8.7 60.3 
1887 22.3 14.1 25.0 20.1 10.1 0.2 8.2 77.2 
1890 16.3 18.0 19.1 18.6 19.8 0.7 8.6 71.2 
1893 13.0 14.8 19.3 19.1 23.4 3.5 7.7 72.2 
1898 12.5 11.1 15.5 18.8 27.2 3.3 10.6 67.7 
1903 13.9 9.3 13.5 19.8 31.7 2.6 9.5 75.3 
1907 14.5 10.9 13.6 19.4 28.9 3.9 8.8 84.3 
1912 13.6 12.3 12.2 16.4 34.8 2.9 7.7 84.5 
Table 1: Reichstag Elections 1871-1912 
Source: Hohorst, Gerd et al. 1978. Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Vol. 2. 1870-1914. München: Beck. 
p. 173-176. 
 
Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter Verein (ADAV) 
Ferdinand Lassalle, an active member of the 1848 democratic revolution in 
Germany, author, and orator was one of the leading figures of working class organization. 
His devotion to socialist political organization eventually propelled him to the top of the 
ADAV. Indeed, members of the group were even often referred to as Lassalleans. While 
the ADAV was not strictly Marxist, Lassalle himself was heavily influenced by the 




but his ideas remained the basis of ADAV dogma until the organization joined the SDAP 
to form the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAPD), the direct precursor to 
the SPD, in 1875 
Ferdinand Lassalle accepted the position as leader of the first workers’ party in 
Germany in early 1863 and by the end of May that year, the ADAV had formulated a 
party constitution that prioritized enfranchisement – the universal, equal and direct vote –
as its main goal. Lassalle had previously advocated for the need for a political party 
representing workers’ interests. This party had to be independent from the existing liberal 
parties that had served as the political representatives of working class up to this time. 
Lassalle and his supporters created the ADAV as the organization for this project. 
Lassalle believed in the supremacy of the “Iron Law of Wages” in a capitalist 
system. Under this law, attributed to the English economist David Ricardo, wages could 
not over– or undershoot the minimum wage necessary for mere subsistence. The main 
demands of the ADAV called for reform of the Prussian three-class voting system. This 
system was fundamentally inegalitarian and designed to ensure that a small class of elite 
land holders had a far greater political voice than the vastly larger lower classes of 
society (Ziblatt 2008).  
On the question of German unification Lassalle argued for a großdeutsch (greater 
German) solution that would have united all of the German speaking countries under one 
central ruler. Furthermore, after the voting system was overhauled and democracy 
implemented, a critical role of the democratic state would be the protection and 
promotion of labor associations and unions. Lassalle viewed the party as in opposition to 




were built around Lassalle and his position as unquestioned leader of the party, whose 
organization consequently reflected his dogma and persona at all levels. (Brandt and 
Lehnert 2013; Potthoff and Miller 2006: 28). After Lassalle’s death (during a duel over a 
love affair), under the new leader Johann Baptist von Schweitzer the party shifted slightly 
from the hardline policies and centralized structure of the Lassallean era. Von 
Schweitzer’s retirement as the head of the party removed one of the only remaining 
obstacles to party consolidation (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 38). 
Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SDAP) 
Both of the leaders of the SDAP, Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel had been 
a part of Lassalle’s ADAV. They each developed an affinity for the socialist cause in 
Germany during their tenure in the ADAV (Lehnert and Ebert 2015). Eventually, 
however, both men left the organization in order to form their own party, first the 
Sächsische Volkspartei and later the SDAP. Prior to unification in 1871, both Liebknecht 
and Bebel were elected as representatives to the North German Reichstag. Since the 
constitution of the North German Confederation was the basis of the German Reich’s 
constitution the same unequal divisions of power existed between the upper and lower 
houses of the legislature. 
Already in his early years as a member of the ADAV August Bebel critiqued the 
organizational structure of the party as underestimating and, in fact, inhibiting the self-
sufficiency he saw as an essential part of the working class. His preferred version of 
socialism saw labor unions as fertile ground for the propagation and promotion of the 
movement’s core ideals. This conceptualization of the socialist movement starting from 
the bottom up stood in direct opposition to Lassalle’s call for a new socialist party. Still, 




liberation of labor. Together with Wilhelm Liebknecht, in 1866 Bebel founded the 
Sächsische Volkspartei (SV) which won 3 seats in parliament in the North German 
elections of 1867. Both Bebel and Liebknecht, who entered the parliament following 
these electoral results, contended that the social and political emancipation of the 
laboring class were inextricably linked. Therefore, they demanded a free political state as 
the necessary pre-condition to economic freedom. At this point the SV had no desire to 
form an alliance with any other party, due to their fundamental differences (Lehnert and 
Brandt 2013). Similar to the ADAV, the party attempted to establish itself as the 
alternative to the liberal democratic parties that had controlled much of the working class 
vote in previous elections. 
At Eisenach, in 1869, Bebel and Liebknecht renamed the party the 
Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (SDAP), which included numerous union 
organizations as well as a large membership base of previous SV members and even a 
number of ADAV repudiators. The party drafted the Eisenacher Programm at this party 
congress. In the document the authors included numerous demands, based on Marxist 
theory, to go along with the call to establish the free democratic state. The SDAP 
distinguished itself from the ADAV in a few distinct ways. First, their conceptualization 
of the unified German state was not Großdeutsch. Instead they advocated for a 
Kleindeutsch solution that only unified the northern states. Additionally, the party 
favored a federalist structure as opposed to the centralist system of government that the 
ADAV promoted. The idea of self-governance was further reinforced by the SDAP’s 




believe in the necessity of unions in order to promote socialist ideals in everyday life. 
Instead the ADAV promoted unionism mostly on an industry scale.  
Even with such opposing views of the structure of the new state, the common 
adherence to the basic ideas of Marx provided a sufficient foundation for the ADAV and 
SDAP to combine their organizations into the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands 
(SAPD; Socialist Worker’s Party of Germany), the precursor of the SPD. 
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAPD): 
At the 1875 party congress in Gotha, members of the ADAV and SDAP joined 
together to establish the basic principles of the SAPD. Although both parties were 
proponents of socialist politics, their principles differed on numerous points. Still, the 
parties were unified in their commitments to the plight of the working class based in 
Marxist teachings as well as the advocacy for a democratic state. 
Following the proclamation of the German Reich and establishment of the 
popularly elected Reichstag for all of Germany in 1871, the two parties found themselves 
in a new political arena. The southern states were much more liberal than the northern 
confederation, which was dominated by conservative Prussia (Orlow 2008). In part 
fueled by this heterogeneity, the Reichstag contained over a dozen different parties after 
the first elections. In 1871, standing separately for election, the two Social Democratic 
parties combined only garnered 3.2 percent of the vote. Increased success in the 1874 
elections, especially in urban socialist centers such as Berlin, sent a signal to the 
leadership of the parties that they could carve out a space in this new political 
environment. Additionally, punitive measures taken by the state against socialist 
politicians did not appear to discriminate between the two organizations, promoting a 




Once they had established themselves as opposed to the ruling authoritarian state, 
both the ADAV and SDAP were able to function as opposition parties in the Reichstag. 
As a result of the parties’ open disdain for the existing order, the ruling elite attempted to 
curtail socialist freedoms by imprisoning leaders and eventually drafting actual 
legislation in an attempt to stymie the rise of socialist ideology. Nonetheless, growing 
support for socialist ideas bolstered the confidence of Bebel and Liebknecht (Brandt and 
Lehnert 2015). 
Though unique ideas are foundational for both the ADAV and the SDAP and the 
future of the unified SAPD, the Gotha program could be read as a doctrine of 
organizational unity rather than any concrete set of theoretical ideas: all things being 
equal, one might hold that the organizational imperative of unification drove the 
formulation of specific ideas in the program.  Following Lipset and Rokkan, for example, 
it would seem apparent that the formation of socialist parties during the 19th century 
reflect a new and growing cleavage between labor and capital (Stein and Rokkan 1967). 
Although they focus on twentieth century political history their insights lend themselves 
to a discussion of party formation in the 19th century as well. The emergence of two 
separate representative parties for the emerging working class suggest that the cleavage 
based approach to party formation is particularly pertinent in this case. On the other hand, 
Rokkan and Lipset assume a democratic playing field in their explanation of party 
formation that is not yet established in late 19th century Germany. This aspect limits the 
explanatory power of their organizational approach for my case study.  
At this early point in the political history of the SPD, strength required numbers. 




compromise. Wilhelm Liebknecht, leader of the party in Eisenach, a small town in 
Thuringia, and tasked with drafting the SAPD’s program, was motivated by a conviction 
that compromise was necessary on programmatic beliefs. However, Marx and other 
scholars have pointed out that unification was much more beneficial to the ADAV, and 
the SDAP consequently would have had greater leverage (Marx 1875; Walter 2009). This 
further suggests that at this early stage organizational interests outweighed the influence 
of ideas as an independent cause of the formulation of certain programmatic beliefs.  
The final program of the Gotha gathering contained Lassallean principles within a 
framework of Marxist ideas about the political economy. Critics such as Marx himself 
have referred to the congress at Gotha as the Kompromißkongreß (Congress of 
Compromise), and compromise there was. This is based in the belief that Liebknecht and 
his colleagues appeased the Lassallean delegation too much even though they held the 
upper hand in negotiations. Furthermore, Marx argues that this compromise came at too 
high of a cost to the Eisenacher delegates, his preferred branch of German socialist 
politics (Marx 1875). However, the program established at Eisenach directly constrained 
the bargaining power of the SDAP at Gotha. Their fifth commitment includes a statement 
concerning the necessity of a unified worker’s movement in order to accomplish their 
goal of establishing a free people’s state (Eisenach 1869). As a result of this statement the 
party organization had little power to curtail the demands of party members.  
Because the SAPD formed in response to a particular institutional context the 
ideas in the program do not amount to a clear and full-fledged ideology. It would appear, 
then, that ideas follow organization here: This program serves the purpose of unifying the 




sharing a common class interest were propelled by this class identity to join together. In 
the process, their ideas about the role of the state were of secondary importance relative 
to the organizational imperatives at hand. As long as the major tenets of socialism were 
preserved, the particular ideas and the concrete pathways for their implementation were 
of reduced importance to the movement. In his critique Marx rightly points out that, as 
the first program of the unified worker’s movement, the ideas put forth in this manifesto 
would provide the benchmark by which one “measures the level of the Party movement” 
(Marx 1875).  
Internal strife in the ADAV had left the party vulnerable, but the Lassallean 
delegation used its experience with political negotiation to extract concessions from 
Liebknecht and his comrades from Eisenach. Marx points out in his critique that the 
program is rife with Lassallean language. In order to explain why a program written up 
by one of Marx and Engels’ closest allies in the promotion of German socialism included 
so many aspects of the competing Lassallean ideology, which Marx himself likened to a 
religion (Heiligschriften), we certainly need to understand the importance Liebknecht 
placed on uniting the party at the time of writing (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 36). While 
this again speaks to the organizational imperative, a close look at key sections, some 
highlighted by Marx, clearly shows the effect competition between ideas from both sides 
of the movement had in the foundational document of the Social Democratic Party in 
Germany. I provide this close analysis in the next section. 
Despite the manifest organizational imperatives, the formulation of Marxist ideas 
carried significant weight in its own right, and we should read the Erfurt program, in 




authors had a relatively high level of freedom in deciding what to include given that, “the 
mere fact of unification [was] satisfying to the workers” (Marx 1875: 138). However, the 
Marxist influence that was merely underlying the Gotha Program is clearly expressed in 
the very first lines of the Erfurt Program. “The economic development of bourgeois civil 
society leads with natural necessity to the demise of small business, which is based on the 
worker’s private ownership of his means of production” (SPD 1891: 81). The clear 
expression of these ideas about the working class, obscured in the language of the Gotha 
Program, can only be explained by the power of Marxist ideas about capitalist political 
economy.  
Those ideas had driven both of the original socialist parties’ programmatic 
platforms, and they now needed to be funneled into a unified document. The authors of 
the Gotha Program had a broad range of options in drafting the theoretical basis of the 
unified worker’s movement (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 40). However, the program itself 
shows a strategic element based in a belief that the future of socialist politics in the 
German Empire was contingent on compromise between the Eisenacher and Lassallean 
programs. Though von Schweitzer was Lassalle’s heir as the head of the ADAV, it was 
Wilhelm Liebknecht who penned most of the finalized Gotha Program (Lehnert and 
Ebert 2015). 
Whatever we consider the primary explanation for the adoption of specific 
programmatic language, this explanation often functions in conjunction with one or both 
of the other families I have identified. Thus, though I argue that the language of the 
Gothaer Programm is best explained by the power of ideas, an organizational approach 




the socialist movement in German society had a theoretical foothold. The subsequent 
evolution of programmatic language from the Gotha Program to the Erfurt program, 
together with the success of socialist societal organization and political representation in 
Germany in the face of state repression, suggest that Marxist ideas concerning the 
evolution of economic systems, the constitution of the working class and the need for a 
socialist political party replace organizational explanations as the primary approach to 
understanding the party membership’s position taking on democracy and capitalism.  
 
Gotha Program 
Ideas regarding the relationship between democracy, socialism and capitalism 
best explain the evolution of positions from Gotha to Erfurt. The demands of the two 
programs are almost identical. They both desire democratization of the German state, a 
voice for its people. The two actionable proposals find their basis in a theoretical section 
that precedes them. In analyzing ideas this theoretical section provides a picture of the 
SAPD’s positions on the issue of how democracy and capitalism are intertwined, or 
fundamentally opposed. In order to explain these positions a look at the ideas driving the 
theory is necessary.  
The theoretical portion of the Gotha Program is split into two separate sections. 
The first outlines the party’s view of contemporary German society whereas the second 
deals more closely with the goals of the party. The SAPD views the current state of 
society as deeply unjust. “In today’s society the means of production are monopolized by 
the capitalist class; as a result the dependence of the working class is the cause of misery 




as the causing the “misery and subjugation” of the working classes. However, it does not 
put forth a critique of capitalism at large.  
The method to allay these injustices, according to the Gotha Program, remains the 
socialization of the means of production as well as “the cooperative regulation” of 
production (SPD 1875: 86). Already within this first section capitalism, socialism and 
democracy are placed into conversation with each other. Based in the interplay between 
these three political-economic systems the SAPD elucidates its goals in section two of the 
Gotha Program. Within this section we see the hierarchy between the three 
aforementioned systems.  
The Lassalleans and Eisenachers, in the years prior to their unification, had 
differed on questions of state support in the transformation from capitalism to socialism. 
Whereas the SDAP favored a more revolutionary tack of transformation the ADAV saw 
the democratic state as the precondition fro socialism. As a party purportedly concerned 
with working class interests, the SAPD at Gotha seemed far more interested in reforming 
the existing political order than in eliminating the current class rule and mode of 
production. The program of the SDAP at Eisenach included mentions of the 
Klassenkampf (class struggle) that are notably absent from the Gotha Program. This 
difference can be traced back to Lassallean ideas about the role of the state in liberating 
the proletariat and organizing socialist society (Walter 2009).  
Another major differences between the program of the ADAV and the SDAP was 
the emphasis on the role of trade unions in the class struggle. Trade unions provided the 
arena for self-advocacy favored by Bebel and Liebknecht, but they were not necessary to 




 In the Gotha Program, Lassallean ideas about the primary role of the state in the 
transition from capitalism to socialism overshadowed a more radical revolution of 
society. In fact, the program expressed the idea that state aid is necessary to solve the so-
called social problem. “The Socialist Worker Party of Germany demands, in order to 
initiate the solution of the social question, the erection of socialist productive association 
with help of the state under the democratic control of the working peoples” (SPD 1875: 
87). At the core of this statement is the idea that democracy must precede socialism. 
Instead of revolutionary upheaval of the current system this type of approach grants the 
state a role in the regulation of the working class. Lassalle’s ideas about the benefits of 
democracy, even nested in the unjust system of capitalism, supersede a social movement 
of the working class even while admitting that the “The liberation of labor must be the 
work of the working class” (SPD 1875: 87).  
These ideas, while highly theoretical, provide the basis for the practical demands 
of the party. Democracy remains the goal of the working class movement, and with good 
reason, if the party leadership held the idea that strength lay in numbers. The party in the 
Gotha Program expresses a view of capitalism as resilient against these numbers without 
political power. However, the processes of achieving this power are not naturally 
determined as in Marx, rather they require work from within the system in order to 
transform it. Still the demands for democracy resonated with a many members of the 
working class who felt they finally had a unified party to represent their interests at the 






The electoral success of the SAPD and its representatives in the 1870’s affirms 
that unification was necessary for the success of socialist ideas in the German Empire. In 
the elections following the Gotha congress, the social democratic share of the vote rose to 
9.1 percent – a full 3 percent increase over the previous elections (Horhorst 1978). In the 
wake of these electoral successes Bismarck passed the aforementioned Sozialistengesetze. 
Though these laws were enacted to curtail the power of the socialist movement they did 
little in the way of defeating the emerging German socialist ideology and party. 
Although the law constrained the organization of socialist parties during its time 
in effect, it was unable to compete with the ideas that had taken hold of a large class of 
laboring Germans. Even in the face of misinformation about socialist involvement in the 
assassination attempts, the SAPD was able to win more votes than prior to Gotha. The 
only recourse available to the socialist movement was election to the Reichstag and state 
level Landestage. Indeed, numerous socialist thinkers and politicians, Bebel and 
Liebknecht among them, were elected to these governmental bodies as independent 
candidates. The speech of elected officials was protected and so the ideas of social 
democracy could be spread, even without formal organizational structures, as reprints of 
congressional debates show (Brandt and Lehnert 2015). As the hysteria following the 
assassination attempts of the Kaiser disappeared from voters’ memories, the electoral 
support for socialist ideas began to grow once more. In the final election before 
Bismarck’s resignation in 1890, social democrats won nearly twenty percent of the vote 
putting them on par in terms of representation with Bismarck’s conservative party. 
Even while he was pressured by mounting electoral support for the social 




successes, Bismarck advocated for socialist policies in the form of his welfare state 
legislation (Orlow 2008). Bismarck oversaw the implementation of a welfare state some 
of whose features are still in place in Germany today. Welfare policy included legislation 
on medical and accident insurance, state-supported pensions and disability protections. 
One common interpretation of this expansion argues that Bismarck attempted to encroach 
on the social democrats’ positions on social policy (Lehnert and Ebert 2015). However, 
their continued success before, during, and especially after the implementation of these 
policies shows that the party’s success was not merely based on their stance on such 
issues but in fact on the ideas that underlay these positions and motivated the party and its 
members. 
Erfurt 
The anti-socialist laws only reinforced the belief of many socialists that the state 
was primarily a means of oppression (Potthoff and Miller: Ch. III). This idea is 
manifested in the Erfurt program of 1891. On the heels of its largest electoral success, the 
party met for the first time since Gotha to reformulate its basic program and reflect the 
ideas of the party in its current form. One of Marx’s major critiques of the Gotha 
Program had been that it came at too high a cost to the socialist (Marxist?) movement. 
Specifically, he believed that a theoretical section was unnecessary for the goal of uniting 
the two parties. Marx argued that a program of principles should not have been drawn up 
at such an early period. The party would be better situated to make such doctrinal 
decisions after some time as a unified organization. The maturity and conformity of the 
ideas expressed in the Erfurt Program vindicate his argument. Indeed, this Program is 
much more the basis of SPD ideology. State repression and financial crises set the stage 




working class and the organization of society are at the heart of both documents but 
expressed clearly for the first time in the Erfurt program.  
Though deeply influenced by the Marxist tradition as promoted by Kautsky, and 
although it certainly idealized a socialist order, the Erfurt Program is still very much 
concerned with the issues of political rights, and in this regard it also picks up themes 
from the Gotha Program. Both platforms include numerous nearly identical demands. 
Richard Hall in his article concerning the role of ideas in politics offers a discussion of 
what he terms “policy paradigms.” Following his argument, what parties believe sets the 
bounds for what actions they can take (Hall 1993). Since the actionable proposals of both 
the Gotha and Erfurt programs are so similar a case can be made that they both exist 
within the same policy paradigm. The theoretical portions of the two programs are the 
main sections of difference. If the ideas remain the same throughout the programs then 
the organizational pressure to unite the two workers’ parties must explain the overall 
direction of the Gotha Program. For its lack of pressure cannot adequately explain the 
change in the theoretical portion of the Erfurt Program. Instead we must look to the ideas 
that Kautsky included in Erfurt to explain the renewed emphasis on the connections 
between inequality and socialism.  
One of the major projects of the Gotha Program was to highlight the role of the 
working class in its own liberation. New ideas about the role of the state in transforming 
capitalism were included in the new Program. In order to promote the self-sufficiency of 
the working class the SAPD attempted to institutionalize class-consciousness in the form 
of a political party. This required forming a coalition around the ideas describing what 




of self-aware members of the working class had grown to a size that made the precursor 
to the SPD a viable contender in parliamentary elections. Bolstered by this show of 
popular support, in 1891, Karl Kautsky drafted the Erfurt Program in an effort to clearly 
delineate the theoretical positions that had been missing from the Gotha Program.  
The Erfurt Program includes a detailed “mission statement” that defined what the 
SAPD, now renamed the SPD, believed to be the inevitable march towards socialism. 
The descriptions of the contemporary state of society in Gotha are replaced by the 
underlying evolutionary processes of economics in forming the unjust relations of 
bourgeois civil society. “The economic development of bourgeois civil society leads with 
natural necessity to the demise of small business, which is based on the workers’ private 
ownership of his means of production” [emphasis mine] (SPD 1891: 81). As opposed to 
the Gotha Program, which says little about the development of bourgeois civil society, 
the Erfurt program clearly outlines a view of societal reform as the necessary 
precondition for worker liberation in the form of socialism. 
The opposing classes in the Erfurt Program are explicitly defined as the owners of 
property on the one hand, and the landless proletariat on the other (SPD 1891: 81). As the 
“capitalists and large land owners” consolidate the ownership of the means of production 
(SPD 1891: 82), the mass of landless proletariats grows. “Ever larger becomes the 
number of the proletarians, evermore massive the army of excess laborers, ever sharper 
the opposition between exploiters and exploited, evermore intense the class struggle 
between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, that divides modern society” (SPD 1891: 82). As 
this class grows it not only becomes more of a political threat but also grows in class-




positioned to be the vanguard of the revolution (SPD 1891: 82). According to the Erfurt 
Program, social inequality is necessary for the move from capitalism to socialism. 
Because the working class is the “loser” of the current system of production, it, and it 
alone, can organize to alleviate this inequality. While political power is necessary for the 
eventual development of new economic organization, the SPD argues in Erfurt that this 
must be a social fight first and foremost. 
This program represents a departure from the mixed messages of the Gotha 
program. Gone are all the Lassallean notions of the role of the state in leading this 
emancipatory charge. The program focuses on inequalities of ownership in order to build 
the rest of its argument for the progression of German society. “This societal 
transformation means the liberation, not only of the Proletariat, but of the entire Human 
Race that suffers under the contemporary conditions” (Erfurt 1891). The very economic 
inequality that the party disdains becomes the basis of class organization. As the 
movement grows and succeeds, the goal of equality under socialism becomes more 
attainable. Through the social ownership of the means of production the entire output of 
society returns to and benefits all of its members. Though this process benefits all, it is 
the working class that stands to gain from these types of revolutionary shifts within the 
current state of society. The commitments made in the Erfurt Program are more 
concerned with the liberalization and democratization of German society rather than 
German politics in order to allow the SPD to come to political power. Since this was the 
precondition of the transition from capitalism to socialism, little is proposed in the way of 
legislating against the gulf between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Instead this idea is 





From a fragmented movement to a unified organization, the positions of the 
representatives of working class politics in Germany during the late 19th century are best 
explained by ideas concerning the role of the state in transitioning to socialism. The 
Marxist teachings so prevalent in the Erfurt Program show the importance of his 
economic theory to how the party understood the environment it operated in. Because of 
the comprehensiveness and foundational nature of their programmatic beliefs, the other 
parts of the document can only be explained in relation to them. Although Gotha was first 
and foremost a document meant to appease two separate parties, the ideas that influenced 
it are also important to understand the languages used. Liebknecht’s own belief that the 
Lassallean delegation required appeasement on these theoretical issues meant that many 
of Lassalle’s own interpretations of the economic sphere were included. These ideas 
placed a premium on the role of the state in liberating the working class, as opposed to 
some of the more revolutionary aspects of pure Marxist doctrine.  
After a period of persecution and economic uncertainty, the identity of the 
working class solidified over the course of the Foundational Period. As a result of 
increased class-consciousness the Social Democratic Party survived a time where mass 
organization was all but impossible. In fact, the lived experiences of the members of the 
party led to the unanimous acceptance, nearly word for word, of language from Marx’s 
own work to lay the theoretical foundation of the party. The role of the working class in 
its own liberation is underscored in the Erfurt Program. No longer does it require state aid 
to achieve its goals but the working class can achieve those goals on its own and in the 
process wrest political power away from the bourgeois elite. The social theories 




Germany for the next 30 years. As the leadership shifted, so too began a shift away from 
the primacy of ideas to the reformism that defined much of the early 20th century 
electoral history of the SPD. This strategy manifested itself most noticeably in the party’s 
support of the First World War and forced the leadership to reimagine the party 
organization in the wake of the Great War.
48 
Chapter 3: The Weimar Republic (1919-1933) 
 
The German Left faced a new social and political order following the German 
defeat in World War One. Their prominent role in parliament leading up to the outbreak 
of war placed them at the forefront of the construction of this new state. This chapter 
looks at how the German Left negotiated the new and changing complexities of Weimar. 
In historians’ imaginations, Weimar is a single period. Some see it as a period of cultural 
proliferation worth studying on its own merits or in reference to the preceding 
Kaiserreich (Peukert 1993; Weitz 2013). Some are more interested in the relationship 
between Weimar and the rise of National Socialism (Mommsen 1998; Winkler 2005).  
For my purposes, the period is better illuminated by splitting it in two parts: 1918-
1923 and 1923-1929. The first period (1918-1923) was marked by revolution, 
democratization and hyperinflation. In contrast, the second period (1923-1929) was 
relatively stable. During this time the KPD and SPD both produced new programs 
reflecting the new societal conditions. Additionally, this period of Germany’s first 
democracy, post-war reconstruction and rapid modernization occurred in an incredibly 
complex manner. Consequently, one single line of argument may not yield a sufficient 
understanding of the party positions concerning the relationship between capitalism and 
socialism. Thus, here I attempt to compare the usefulness of organizational, spatial and 
ideational accounts in explaining the programmatic language of the parties on the Left. 
For the first period, organizational features and pressures, such as changes in 
party leadership and competition between internal factions, best explain the language 




(1919), SPD (1921), and USPD (1919). As Germany’s political system changed its 
economy and society experienced great turbulence. We would expect a resulting shift in 
both the electoral salience of economics as well as the claims staked out concerning the 
issue of the interplay between democracy and capitalism.  
After the revolutionary beginnings of the new republic by 1923, a semblance of 
order had emerged. Devastating hyperinflation slowed through a combination of 
renegotiated terms of reparation payments and the introduction of the Reichsmark (Evans 
2004). In this second period of stability (1923-1929), the parties had time to reassess their 
programs. Changes in positions on democracy and capitalism and increased competition 
between leftist parties led to a set of programs distinctly different from those they offered 
in the immediate post-war years.  
Both the Social Democrats and the Communists produced new programs during 
this period. The KPD offered its Action Program to the voters in April 1924 prior to the 
first of two elections in that year. Following this new program, the KPD achieved major 
gains in parliamentary elections. In 1925, after elections in December of the previous 
year, the SPD published the Heidelberg Program. Due to the dissolution of the USPD, I 
focus on programs by the SPD and KPD to provide evidence for my argument. I contend 
that electoral competition between these two parties can aid us in understanding the 
positions taken on bourgeois democracy that they offer in their revised party programs. 
 As the political economic context changed, the parties’ positions changed, too. In 
order to answer the question of why the programmatic language of the parties on the left 
concerning capitalism and democracy changed so rapidly and drastically requires an 




the Weimar Republic’s political and economic landscape to provide a context for this 
analysis. Next I turn to the first batch of programs. Starting with the KPD’s Spartacus 
Program (1919) I provide a brief introduction of the party, an interpretation of their 
document and a discussion of the implications for my argument that at this early stage of 
democratization (1919-1923) questions of party organization matter more than the ideas 
of the past and the pressures of other parties electoral positions. I do the same for the 
USPD’s program of 1919 and the SPD’s Görlitz Program (1921).  
After a discussion of the relationships between the programs I turn to the next 
period of Weimar (1923-1929), an era of stability (Fullbrook 2004: Ch. 6). Increased 
polarization between anti-system (non-democratic) parties and supporters of the political 
system of the Republic marked this period politically.  The KPD and SPD, though both 
on the left, found themselves on opposite poles of this spectrum. Following the same 
structure of the previous section I compare positions of the KPD and SPD programs, 
from 1924 and 1925 respectively, to their prior programs as well as to each other in order 
to substantiate my argument. At this point of relatively well functioning parliamentary 
democracy, competition over policy positions between the two parties best explains their 
positions on their own relationship to both bourgeois democracy and capitalism and the 
transformation to socialism. Since no major party on the left offered a drastically 
reformulated program in the final years of the republic, I end this chapter with a 
description of the rise of the NSDAP, their appropriation of leftist language and the end 
of the first era of democracy in Germany. However, first, I describe Germany’s new 
polity, defined by new rules of the game inscribed in the Weimar constitution as well as 




The Weimar Republic (1919-1933) 
The Weimar Republic began its life as a democracy after World War I at the call 
of prominent Social Democratic political leaders in November 1918. Friedrich Ebert, the 
leader of the SPD, accepted the Reich chancellor Prince Max von Baden’s appointment to 
be the next “Imperial Chancellor” (Fullbrook 2004: 159). The SPD formed the first 
provisional government of the German Republic together with the Independent Socialist 
party (USPD). The German population, however, was not as amenable to agreement as 
the leadership of the USPD and SPD. Massive polarization over political issues as well as 
the legacy of the war and the revolutionary uprising of workers and soldiers that had 
ended the war led to civil unrest (Orlow 2008). Revolutionary troops and partisan militias 
fought each other in the streets of Berlin, Munich and other cities. Amidst this disorder, 
the constitutional assembly retreated to the town of Weimar, 60 miles south of Berlin 
(Evans 2004).  
The Weimar constitution authored by the assembly departed from the Reich’s 
constitution in a number of ways.  A new Reich president replaced the Kaiser as the head 
of the state. The authors of the constitution retained the bicameral division of parliament 
from the founding constitution, but expanded suffrage to all male and female citizens 
above the age of 20 (Fullbrook, 2004). The proportional representational electoral system 
also ensured that single states could no longer dominate the political agenda, as Prussia 
had been able to. While a short period of stability occurred from 1924-1929, overall the 
period of Weimar democracy remained unstable politically, both due to institutional 
failures of the final constitution and as a result of economic turbulence culminating in the 
devastation of the Great Depression (Evans 2004). The proletarianization predicted by 




electorate shrunk during the period of Weimar (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 39). 
Together with diminishing public belief that the current political system could ensure 
their material well being, this environment set the stage for Hitler’s rise to power and the 
end of German democracy for a period of nearly fifteen years. I have chosen to end the 
period of Weimar with the end of parliamentary democracy in 1933 (Conradt 1996). 
The internal rift between the reformist and revolutionary factions that had plagued 
the SPD throughout its time in the turned into an even wider chasm over support of the 
war. The sections of the SPD that had advocated for the war did so strategically. In fact, 
they expected, and eventually received, massive democratic gains in the form of universal 
suffrage and parliamentary democracy as well as social and worker protections (Eley 
2002). In 1914, the entire SPD Reichstag delegation voted in favor for the German War 
Credits, signaling a shift in the party’s direction (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 70). The 
moderate, pragmatic members of the party, such as Friedrich Ebert, became its face. They 
advocated for a national conceptualization of social democracy at odds with the matter of 
international worker solidarity with the commitment to internationalism evident in the 
Erfurt Program. Moderate Social Democrats bargained that war support would yield 
expanded social reforms after the war (Eley 2002). 
 Following the proclamation of the Weimar Republic in 1918, the number of 
parties in German elections grew. Two factors contribute to this proliferation. First, the 
fall of the empire rendered numerous old regime parties obsolete (Orlow 2008: 114). 
Second, the establishment of a parliamentary democracy with expanded suffrage created 
new classes of voters over which parties competed for. As a result of this new system, the 




The SPD attempted to change its appeal in the Görlitz Program, but the change did not 
have the desired effect. Internal obstacles and disagreement prevented the party from 
reshaping its identity at the beginning of a new political system, my first sub-period, 
when it may have had a chance to do so. In the second sub-period after failing to 
overcome its organizational roadblocks, positional pressure put on the SPD by the 
Communist Party can better explain the changes in programmatic language. 
First Programs (1919-1923) 
 
 1919 1920 1924a 
Participation 83.0 79.2 77.4 
KPD X 2.1 12.6 
USPD 7.6 17.6 0.8 
SPD 37.9 21.9 20.5 
DDP 18.6 8.3 5.7 
Zentrum 15.9 13.6 13.4 
BVP 3.8 4.4 3.2 
DVP 4.4 13.9 9.2 
DNVP 10.3 15.1 19.5 
NSDAP X X 6.5 
Other 1.6 3.3 8.6 
Table 2:Reichstag Election 1919-May 1924 
Source: Jürgen Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik, München 1986 
X= did not compete as a party in these elections 
 
The successes of the USPD and the KPD at the beginning of the Weimar Republic 
restructured the competition between parties on Left. All Leftist parties in Germany 
during this time faced the same task of formulating a program reflecting the seismic shifts 
in society during this new era of popular, parliamentary democracy. Additionally, they all 
desired the same end goal: the abolition of the capitalist state and the eventual transition 
to socialism. In terms of economic rhetoric, the transition to socialism would level the 
playing field for all workers, male and female. The basic tenets of socialism are apparent 
in any reading of the three parties’ early Weimar programs. Indeed, the very way in 




identical. However, the strategies they promote to secure the social, political and 
economic freedom of the working class differs. The role of the state ranges from 
counterproductive to necessary as we move from KPD to SPD. Each party also describes 
itself as the educators and organizers of the working class. The difference between these 
parties at this early stage in their modern development remains in their organization. The 
SPD attempted a top-down transformation of the party into a mass party. In contrast, both 
USPD and KPD remained committed to a system of Räte (Councils), as the major 
organizational body of the mass of workers in the republic, a commitment that constricted 
their ability to produce radically different programs. 
Why Not Ideas 
In the interwar years, vestigial ideas from the Wilhelmine Era constrained the 
possible positions that the SPD could take on issues surrounding whether and how to 
approach the transformation of capitalism to socialism. These ideas help explain how the 
party was constrained but are less powerful as an explanation of why the positions the 
party staked out within this context manifested themselves in the party’s programs. The 
Erfurt program was the point of departure for any updates to the SPD’s programmatic 
beliefs. As we have seen, a deep commitment to orthodox Marxism and an emphasis on 
the natural necessity (Naturnotwendigkeit) of socialism’s victory stood at the center of 
the program. This determinism deemphasized the party’s own role in the liberation of the 
working class at the very same time as it provided the framework for their political action 
(Berman 1998). Consequently, the SPD was stuck in a space between enacting reform 
work within the very system they blamed for blocking necessary economic 
transformations. Additionally, the Erfurt Program retained the “us versus them” mentality 




the means of production and have as their common goal the preservation of the 
foundations of contemporary society” (SPD 1891: 82). This conceptualization of all 
classes, other than the skilled and unskilled laborer, as uninterested in transforming the 
capitalist system precluded the coalition building efforts of Weimar’s SPD in its quest to 
control political power in the new republic. Combined with the exit threat provide by a 
viable Communist party, this stance resulted in the party only serving in eight of twenty 
cabinets during the 15-year life of the republic (Evans, 2004). The SPD needed coalition 
partners, but the size of working class voters never rose to be a majority of the electorate 
as Marx predicted and the party expected. Even if we include the communist party in our 
calculations the Left in Germany never achieved over 50 percent of the vote (Przeworski 
and Sprague 1986: 25-29). 
As the ideas of the party at the beginning of the Weimar Republic provided 
boundaries for possible position taking they also functioned to create a distinct 
constituency of voters that the party could appeal to. Operating within a fledgling 
republic that was proclaimed as “the most democratic democracy in the world” (Fowkes 
2014: 36), the SPD had to reaffirm its position as the party of the working class or expand 
their voter base to include allies. An organizational line of argument might explain the 
language of the SPD’s Weimar programs as the result of such an expansion. As the 
electorate swelled and it became clear that the working class vote alone could not provide 
the party with the mandate of a majority of votes, the party had to include new sections of 
society into its apparatus. Often these sectors were ones the SPD had previously 




program of the Weimar SPD does appeal to a broader voting base than previous iterations 
of party policy.  
This shift signals a problem with a purely ideational analysis of the party 
language. The Marxist underpinnings of the Erfurt Program had excluded a number of 
social groups in its language. As the following analysis shows, the reorganization of the 
SPD failed as new political organizations on the left sprung up. That these organizations 
were based in an opposition to the party’s attempts to operate within the existing state 
may redeem some aspects of the ideational analysis in explaining the positions taken by 
these offshoots of the SPD. And it is true that in some cases it is difficult to distinguish 
between the effect of ideas on organizations and the role established organizations play in 
shaping their future. In this case an organizational explanation explains the positions 
taken on capitalism and democracy for the Left in Germany only for the first period. The 
ideas of the socialist movement were already manifested in the institutions of the party at 
this time (Berman 1998). This fact made it difficult for the SPD to change its positions on 
major issues. The emergence of two new political organizations, to reflect a competing 
strain in socialist tradition, only supports the idea that these institutions were “sticky”. As 
the SPD organized against the threats of the KPD and USPD the party was forced to 
express their positions in a pro-democratic way and enacted reforms that were supposed 
to increase welfare and prevent these competing organizations from organizing more 
militant leftist workers. The SPD’s Görlitz Program was an attempt by the leadership to 
move the party to where it thought it “should” be in order to maximize its votes. 
However, the failure of this program to deliver on these expectations and the 




party made new ideas difficult to implement in a politically effective way. The positions 
of the Heidelberg Program reflect an acquiescence by the SPD leadership to the electoral 
threat of the KPD. Instead of attempting to radically change its positions the party chose 
to compete with the now established party to its left. Thus, the organizational explanation 
only explains the first positions taken by the SPD, USPD and KPD in Weimar.  
USPD 
 The Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social 
Democratic Party; USPD) formed in 1917 as an alternative to the SPD. In an internal 
debate over the SPD positions on the support of World War One, members of the SPD 
began voting against the party line of support. The party leadership expelled these 
dissidents from its faction in the Reichstag and in April 1917 these former members 
established the USPD (Walter 2009: 46) This move was a detriment to the SPD’s 
electoral prospects but also gave the moderate leaders of the party control of a majority of 
the remaining membership. The leaders of the SPD therefore had more freedom in 
pushing the organization in their desired direction. Members of the USPD coalesced 
around a shared commitment to the left-wing points of the social democratic program. 
Initially, the leadership of the USPD organized themselves within the parliamentary 
group of the SPD. In 1914 the entire parliamentary group voted for the German war 
credits. However, already in 1915 Karl Liebknecht, Wilhelm Liebknecht’s son, broke 
ranks and voted against the credits. By 1916 a 20-member minority of the party group 
voted against the proposed renewal of the war-credits bill. Spurred by a commitment to 
internationalism they felt was impossible to justify in relation to a war of expansion, and 




government, these dissidents formed the Social Democratic Working Group (Potthoff and 
Miller 2006).  
In 1917 this collection of politicians formed the Independent Social Democratic 
Party in Gotha. Though the party emerged as a result of the actions taken by the SPD 
leadership during World War One, it quickly became an arena for radical working class 
people to gather (Walter 2009). The very fabric of the party was woven around the 
condemnation of their bourgeois counterparts. The members of the USPD viewed the 
SPD with contempt given its cooperation with these parties. Particularly young, left-wing 
SPD members switched to the USPD in an attempt to differentiate themselves from the 
pro-war stance of the organization, while still maintaining their ties to the worker’s 
movement and the history of the party (Walter 2009: 48-49). 
Just as the KPD would later define itself in relation to the Unabhängige, the 
USPD fashioned itself as the more radical alternative to the SPD. Many of the 
overarching similarities between the socialist parties—such as a belief in the inevitable 
victory of socialism over capitalism—are also evident in the USPD program. As I give 
these themes more extensive coverage in the section on the KPD I will not reiterate them 
here. However, these similarities can be interpreted as a concession to the organizational 
power of the SPD. Since the SPD still controlled the expansive organizations of social 
democracy in Germany, the other parties could not stray too far from the basic principles 
of the “mother” party. Instead, the USPD forged a middle ground to the left of the SPD 
but not quite so radical in its demands as the KPD. 
 In the 1919 election the USPD garnered 7.1 percent of the vote while the SPD 




election the USPD began to pose a real electoral threat to the SPD. In 1920 the USPD 
saw the largest increase in electoral support of any party in the election with 17.9 percent 
of the vote while the SPD support decreased by roughly 16 percent (Falter 1986). The 
demise of the SPD was in part caused by their inability to follow through on many of 
their promises concerning large-scale socialization (Potthoff and Miller 2006). Both the 
USPD and KPD recognized and highlighted inherent contradictions within the theory and 
praxis of the SPD at the beginning of the Weimar republic and seized on the 
organizational fragmentation of the SPD to reorganize voters to the left of the party. 
USPD Leipzig Program (1919) 
The USPD action program agreed upon in Leipzig in 1919 began with a 
decomposition of the proletarian revolution into two distinct “eras.” The first was the 
fight for control of political power, the second the “maintenance of that power for the 
period of transition from capitalism to socialism” (USPD 1919: 339). While this appears 
to be a statement that the party is willing to work within democracy, the point of 
difference with the SPD was the emphasis on how the fight for political power should go. 
The SPD was happy to work for the electoral support of the working classes to legitimize 
its political power. In contrast, the USPD sided more with the Communists relying on a 
bottom up fight for political power. The USPD sought to “extend the organization of 
councils as the organ of the proletarian struggle for socialism, to integrate together within 
the councils all workers by hand an brain and to train them to exercise the dictatorship of 
the proletariat” (USPD 1919: 340). This position on the transformation of society reflects 
the party’s desire to join the Communist International (as opposed to the Second 
International) (Fowkes 2014: 342). The emphasis on the Rätesystem, the system of 




viewed the Räte and unions as arenas for educating the working class in order to groom 
them for the dictatorship of the proletariat (USPD 1919). Contrary to the SPD the USPD 
did not fashion itself as the organization of the working class. Instead the USPD viewed 
its task as “giv[ing] the working-class movement a content, a direction and an objective, 
and to lead the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for socialism…” (USPD 1919: 
342). The party hoped that these forms of self-governance would eventually undermine 
the existing administrative apparatus. 
 Though it too was an anti-parliamentary party, that it is it advocated for the 
replacement of the bourgeois parliament by the “revolutionary Congress of Councils” 
(USPD 1919: 340), the USPD did affirm the short-term benefits of parliamentary 
democracy. In order to achieve the goal of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and thereby 
the destruction of the “economic anarchy of capitalism” (USPD 1919: 340) the party 
“makes use of all political, parliamentary and economic means of struggle…together with 
the revolutionary trade unions and the proletarian council organization” (USPD 1919: 
342). Still, and fundamentally, the party reaffirmed that “[t]he decisive means of struggle 
is the action of the masses” (USPD 1919: 342). The positions of the USPD were steeped 
in the theoretical anti-parliamentarianism of the KPD while appealing to the reform 
minded SPD membership. As a result of this political maneuvering the USPD was able to 
capture a portion of the vote from both sides of the ideological space. However, the KPD 
and SPD were able to successfully squeeze out the USPD from that space and by 1921 
most of the party membership had joined one or the other party. 
KPD 
The Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) finds its origins as an offshoot 




of a political organization around communist ideas. Along with Rosa Luxemburg, 
Liebknecht was one of the major opponents of the German war efforts. During the 
parliamentary votes on the war credits, he had been the first to oppose the party line. 
While many members of the SPD’s parliamentary group followed suit, their motivations 
differed (Potthoff and Miller 2006). The KPD distinguished itself from the USPD by its 
members’ firm commitment to the revolutionary course of direct action. The revolution 
of the economy could “only be accomplished as a process borne along by proletarian 
mass action” (KPD 1919: 282). This statement interpreted alone appears to be compatible 
with the USPD’s emphasis on the dictatorship of the proletariat but read in the anti-
establishment context of the rest of the program a different picture of the role of the KPD 
organization forms.  
 After the murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht on January 15, 1919, the KPD 
was forced to reorganize itself in order to remain politically viable. Seeing the necessity 
of participating in the new parliamentary democracy in order to guide the socialist 
movement, the party stood for parliamentary elections for the first time in 1920. However 
the party’s goal was never to rule, in fact it saw its goal not as electoral victories but 
rather the complete transformation of bourgeois society (Fowkes 2014). The party’s first 
attempt at electoral competition only garnered 2 percent of the vote, infighting within the 
USPD eventually led to defections to the KPD. This influx of membership strengthened 
the KPD’s organization so much that by 1924, the party grew more than any other party 
relative to the last elections, receiving an impressive 12 percent of the vote. 
Ideologically, the KPD is the left most party of the three working-class parties in 




KPD was a revolutionary party at its core. Its aims were never to govern over the long 
term a democratic system that its leaders viewed as the expression of bourgeois power 
(KPD 1919). Instead, the party wanted to enact socialism immediately through the work 
of the working class, it was both the starting point of the party and the end it strived 
towards (Fowkes 2014: 274). In fact, the program was expressly formulated in opposition 
to the SPD’s Erfurt Program. Rosa Luxemburg, while presenting the program at the 
founding congress in 1918, described her task as “sketch[ing] and formulat[ing] the broad 
principles which distinguish our program from what has hitherto been the so-called 
official program of German Social Democracy” (Luxemburg 1918). Although this may 
seem to be a manageable task, the actual content of the 1918 Program is very similar to 
the language used by the majority Social Democrats in the early years of Weimar. 
KPD Spartakus Program (1918) 
The major difference between the KPD and SPD programs does not concern the 
theoretical underpinnings of the actionable proposals but the method by which these are 
to be accomplished. Both the 1919 Spartacus Program of the KPD and the 1921 Görlitz 
Program of the SPD share the assumption that a small class of capitalists is exploiting a 
massive class of workers. Furthermore, the program states “socialism is now the sole 
salvation of society” (KPD 1919: 281). It qualifies this statement with a line that can only 
be interpreted as a direct critique of the methods of the SPD: “This transformation cannot 
be decreed by an official body, commission or parliament” (KPD 1919: 282). In order to 
underline the KPDs opposition to the methods of the SPD it included a conviction that 
“the [KPD] will refuse to come to power…simply because the Scheidemanns and Eberts 
have become bankrupt…by cooperating with them” (KPD 1919: 284). The only way that 




great majority of the proletarian mass in Germany” (KPD 1919: 284). Even this end goal 
of attaining governmental posts did not necessarily reflect the same type of success 
sought after in USPDs or SPDs conceptualization of political power within parliament. 
The KPD viewed itself as a party uninterested in parliamentary power and does 
not see its goal as organizing the working class as the USPD does. Instead, the KPD “is 
simply the section of the proletariat which is most conscious of its goal” (KPD 1919: 
284). That goal was the transition from capitalism to socialism and, consequently, the end 
of bourgeois exploitation and class rule. “The economic transformation too can only be 
accomplished as a process borne along by proletarian mass action” (KPD 1919: 284). 
According to the KPD, the transition to socialism required the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” (KPD 1919: 283). As a result, the party did not see itself as a separate 
organization from the working class. Instead, the party sought to function more as a guide 
and advocate for the interests of the working class (KPD 1919: 284). 
The revolution of society as it existed at that point, namely a capitalist society, 
was not possible at the behest of any authority other than the will and action of the people 
themselves. “The Proletarian mass must replace the outmoded organs of Bourgeois class 
rule with their own class organs: The workers’ and soldiers’ councils” (KPD 1919: 283). 
The worker’s themselves must create the revolutionary processes of socialism through 
collective action such as strikes and the creation of workers’ and soldiers’ councils from 
the bottom up. The KPD did not see the SPD’s top-down reformism as a viable way of 
organizing the working class. Instead, the party advocated for a dictatorship of the 
proletariat. “The dictatorship of the proletariat is a way of arming the compact mass of 




therefore true democracy” (KPD 1919: 283). The party claimed that the current project of 
democracy was merely a veiled attempt of the bourgeoisie to maintain control of 
political, and consequently, social power. “It is an insane delusion to believe that the 
capitalists would obligingly submit to the socialist verdict of a parliament” (KPD 1919: 
283). The democratic equality that the SPD claimed as a hard fought success of previous 
socialists was merely a fiction. Only reorganization of society in the form of councils 
could liberate the working class, the KPD itself did not conceptualize its role in this fight 
as a separate organization but rather as the only political place holders and advocates for 
socialist policies. 
SPD 
As the party that attracted the most voters during the first elections of the Weimar 
Republic, the SPD, together with the Christian Democratic Centre Party (Zentrum) and 
the social liberal Democratic Party, formed the governing Weimar coalition together from 
1919-1922 (Evans 2004). In 1921, the SPD met at Görlitz to modernize its party program 
from Erfurt. The Erfurt Program had been the basis of SPD politics for the last 30 years, 
and had survived as the guiding principles of social democracy through the First World 
War. Still, many in the party considered it outdated (Fowkes 2014: 217-18). The Görlitz 
Program remained theoretically akin to a prewar self-understanding of social democracy 
and Marxism. However, the perceived capitalist oppression had worsened as a result of 
the nascent economic crisis and therefore occupied a new space, unlike in the prewar 
programs.  
Due to successes of the KPD and USPD in organizing voters that had voted for 
the SPD in previous elections, the SPD was forced to rework the language of its program 




statements on how to institute socialism in capitalist society a growing number of the 
militant left wing voters, as well as new voters that had been enfranchised following the 
end of the war, voted for the splinter parties (Brandt and Lehnert 2013: 126). The goal of 
changing the program was to block the expansion of the KPD and USPD above what they 
had already achieved. The establishment of these parties from within the SPD 
organizations also led to a realignment within the party leadership that is reflected in the 
language of the Görlitz Program (1921). 
Even in a period of mass defections from the party, the SPD remained a major 
player in Weimar politics throughout the early years. The distinctive feature of the SPD 
in contrast to its left-wing compatriots was the choice that the leadership made to join a 
government and to embrace parliamentary democracy. The SPD “saw the democratic 
republic as the, through the evolution of history, irreversibly given form of government, 
and every attack against her as an attempt on the right to exist of the people” (SPD 1921: 
1). As the USPD took the more radical members of the SPD, the majority party’s 
leadership was able to move the party closer to the center of the political spectrum 
(Potthoff and Miller 2006). This shift certainly affected the expression of the moderate 
positions on the institutions of bourgeois democracy in the Görlitz Program.   
SPD Görlitz Program (1921) 
As the political and economic context of the Weimar Republic changed, the SPD 
was faced with new opportunities and obstacles to address. An organizational approach to 
understanding the differences in the programs of the German Empire and Weimar best 
explains the shifts in programmatic language of the SPD as a move from a class-based 
party to a modern mass party (as defined by Kircheimer 1966). As the internal divisions 




USPD and KPD, so too did the positions of the party at large as expressed its updated 
program.  
The fact that the party was granted control of the government both by the final 
decree of Prince Max von Baden as well as the favorable results of the first parliamentary 
elections in 1919 (they garnered 37 percent of the vote) only further committed the party 
to a course of democratic mass party rather than revolutionary class party. The positions 
on the benefits of democracy for socialism’s future that the SPD expresses in their Görlitz 
program reflect these organizational shifts. The SPDs policies further show a 
determination to assuage the gains of working class militancy. Social reforms such as the 
eight-hour workday, social insurance, and universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage that 
had been the goals of the SPD under the monarchy now seemed easily attainable. These 
reforms would address some of the very same issues that working class militants fought 
for. Additionally, Ebert acting in his role as Reichskanzler allied the government with the 
military in the fight against “Bolshevism” a movement closely associated with the KPD. 
However, most notably, and in a strong move against the success of the Council System 
favored by the KPD and USPD, the SPD engineered a compromise between unions and 
employers (Eley 2002: 166-68).  
Electorally these actions did not succeed in eliminating the threat of the 
opposition parties. The KPD and USPD had more success in channeling popular support 
for socialization of government in the form of council systems (Eley 2002: 168). The 
USPD and KPD seized on the shortcomings of the SPD and as a result the SPD was 
forced to attempt a programmatic change. The Görlitz program failed to mitigate the 




after the publication of the program the SPD began negotiations with the USPD to 
increase the party’s electoral chances against the growing KPD (Potthoff and Miller 
2006). 
The Program is full of examples of a broadening of language to be as inclusive as 
possible. The “working class” became the “laboring people,” and the “class struggle” was 
no longer central to the theoretical underpinnings of the program (Winkler 1982). 
However, Winkler never goes into the details of why the party sought to increase its 
electoral support. The main explanation he provides is that the party leadership wanted to 
promote the image of the SPD as a viable member of a government in a parliamentary 
democracy to their faithful voters as well as German society as a whole.  
The pressure to expand the electoral support of the SPD is evident in the very first 
lines of the 1921 Görlitz Program. In order to appeal to the larger electorate of the 
Weimar Republic—and one in which viable parties stood to their left—the SPD began 
the program with a description of whom the Party was for. Gone are the Marxist tones of 
historical materialism, “the view that economic development takes place with the 
inevitability of a law of nature and determines the changes in people's social ideas and 
institutions” (Kautsky 1921: 291). Instead the program states in its very first line that the 
“SPD is the party of working people in town and country,” and that “it strives for the 
gathering together of all material and intellectual producers, who are dependent on the 
product of their own labour…” (SPD 1921: 288). 
The SPD blames the war for widening the gulf between wealth and poverty. As 
the bourgeoisie increased its wealth through the consolidation of industry during wartime 




increased economic inequality and created the contrast between a small minority living in 
luxury and the broad strata of people eking out their existence in need and poverty” (SPD 
1921: 289). The successes of the bourgeoisie came at the cost of social groups that earlier 
party programs had not yet addressed: “Small and medium-sized property owners, 
industrialists, intellectual workers, civil servants, writers, teachers, members of all kinds 
of freelance professions” (SPD 1921: 289) were brought to proletarian living standards. 
By constructing the opposition as a small bourgeois segment of society the SPD 
simultaneously constructs the rest of society as oppressed. The program is clear in whom 
the SPD sees as constituting the working class, and thus who must be organized in order 
to successfully bring about socialism.  
In terms of the party’s position on the dominant democratic system, driven by 
their role in government and the organizational restructuring resulting from KPD and 
USPD growth, the SPD takes a positive view of the system. Whereas in previous 
programs the party had called for a political transformation of the repressive monarchical 
system at this period of German history “political transformations have given the masses 
the democratic rights they need for their social ascent” (SPD 1921: 289). Democracy is 
once more the necessary precondition for the liberation of social and economic 
inequalities. The party reaffirms its commitment to the dominant system by tying 
democracy to the historical processes described by Marx that were so central to the Erfurt 
program. “The democratic republic [is] the form of state irrevocably brought into 
existence historical development” (SPD 1921: 289). The party no longer viewed 
democracy as an arena for capitalism to reproduce its unequal results but rather as a 




USPD in the affirmation of constitutional democracy as the form of democracy necessary 
for socialism to operate as opposed to a form of direct democracy such as the council 
systems. The program actually moves the party to the right which is not what we would 
expect using a positional approach.   
 
Second Weimar Era: An Era of Stability (1924-1229) 
 
 
 1924b 1928 1930 1932a 1932b 1933 
Participation 78.8 75.6 82.0 84.1 80.6 88.7 
KPD 8.9 10.6 13.1 14.6 16.9 12.3 
USPD 0.3 0.1 X X X X 
SPD 26.0 29.8 24.5 21.6 20.4 18.3 
DDP 6.3 4.9 3.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Zentrum 13.6 12.1 11.8 12.4 11.9 11.3 
BVP 3.7 3.1  3.0 3.3 3.1 2.7 
DVP 10.1 8.7 4.8 1.2 1.9 1.1 
DNVP 20.5 14.3 7.0 5.9 8.7 8.0 
NSDAP 3.0 2.6 18.3 37.4 33.1 43.9 
Other 7.5 13.9 13.8 2.0 2.6 1.6 
Table 3: Election Results Weimar (Dec. 1924-1933) 
Source: Jürgen Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik, München 1986 
 
Two arenas for spatial pressure as an explanatory variable stand out for the SPD 
during Weimar: the electoral and the coalitional arena. During the Weimar elections the 
SPD no longer existed as the sole party on the left of the ideological spectrum. The 
USPD and KPD each emerged in the years immediately after the end of the war to lay 
claim to issues and voters that had typically been the distinguishing positions for the 
SPD. The effect of this reality was that the SPD could not freely move to the center on 
many issues without being ridiculed by the parties to its left. Not only did the USPD and 
KPD cause trouble for the SPD, but they also provided long time SPD voters with a 
credible exit threat, should they feel that their interests were no longer aligned with the 




SPD also had to make decisions about governing. While the SPD ideology included a 
commitment to opposing the ruling order, party leaders found it prudent to obtain a 
position at the head of the state. While this caused problems for some of the more 
militant members of the party, and aided the foundation of the USPD, it also necessitated 
a coalition agreement with parties in proximate ideological space. Since the left-wing of 
the party identified with the oppositional tactics of earlier iterations of the party the SPD 
was forced to approach parties to its right. The pull from both sides further constrained an 
already slim area of policy to which the SPD could commit itself. Over time the 
positional pull from the left and from the right varied in intensity but created a set of 
preferences expressed in the party’s programs that highlights why these were stances 
taken in a more complete way than either organizational or ideational explanations alone. 
KPD 
Already in 1919 the KPD explicitly outlined its governing strategy. Though the 
party was ardently opposed to the system of bourgeois democracy that the SPD and other 
center parties were hard at work to establish, they left their own role in government open. 
Accordingly the leadership wrote in the Spartacus Program that the KPD,  “will never 
take over the government in any other way than through the clear, unambiguous will of 
the great majority of the proletarian mass in Germany” (KPD 1919: 284). By 1924 the 
KPD was on an electoral upswing, making the likelihood of their role in government 
higher. Still the communist commitment to opposition made this theoretically impossible. 
Instead the KPD continued to promote its role as the promoters of proletarian liberation. 
In fact, the party condemns “the Deutsch volkische, the capitalists and the reformists” for 
the diminishing economic position of the proletariat during the early years of the 




other parties on the Left, the KPD explicitly attacks its rival party on the Left. The 
“reformists” referred to the SPD and their methods of using the democratic system in 
order to relieve the plight of the working class.  
The KPD remains committed to a revolution of the proletariat in their 1924 
Action Program. However, the militant notions of class warfare are less evident in this 
document. Instead the party seeks to “animate the broadest masses of the working 
population” (KPD 1924: 291). As opposed to the Spartacus program where the role of the 
party was to educate and guide the KPD now takes some agency in the organization of 
these masses. “The task of the Communist Party is to prepare and organize the struggle 
for the dictatorship of the proletariat” (KPD 1924: 292). Their methods, however, remain 
similar. “…the organs of the united front must be formed from below and associated 
together for struggle” (KPD 1924: 291).  
The KPD’s position to the left of the SPD provided an exit threat for all members 
of the USPD including the moderate wing. Once it became clear that the USPD and SPD 
were not sustainable as separate parties in the face of increased support for the extreme 
right parties the USPD members were forced to choose between SPD and KPD 
representation (Winkler 1982). Following the dissolution of the USPD over 300,000 of 
the party’s membership left to join the KPD (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 109). The fact 
that the KPD existed forced the SPD to shift left in order to capture at least the moderates 
of the USPD. This pressure was exerted electorally as well. The KPD only received 2 
percent of the vote in their first elections in 1920. These elections preceded the drafting 
of the Görlitz Program and a lack of revolutionary language correlates with the perceived 




both the KPD markedly improved on its result in 1920. In 1925, the SPD published its 
Heidelberg Program. Winkler (1982) classifies the program as a new period in party 
organization, as it officially unified the SPD with the right-wing of the USPD. He 
continues however, that the ideological positions contained within the theoretical part of 
the program were a “return to the positions of the pre war period” (Winkler 1982: 31). 
The question remains, why the SPD returned to these positions after the merger in 1922? 
An organizational explanation can only help us to understand the greater effects that 
interparty competition had on the language of the Heidelberg Program. 
SPD 
“When a socialist party meets communist competition, the opportunity cost of 
following supraclass strategies is high because workers can change their voting behavior 
without changing ideologies” (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 61). The communist party 
in Weimar had this effect on the German SPD. If, with the Görlitz Program, the SPD 
attempted to speak to a broader coalition of voters, the Heidelberg Program was a stark 
departure from this electoral strategy. Given the split between SPD and USPD the 
revisionist core of the SPD formed the majority of the party in 1921. However, after 
1922, when the more moderate wing of the USPD linked back up with the SPD the 
revisionist core’s power within the party dwindled (Winkler 1982). While the internal 
reorganization of the SPD certainly led to the inclusion of more revolutionary language in 
the Heidelberg Program, the existence of the Communist party may better explain why 
the party’s program changed so drastically.  
As parliamentary democracy became the most prominent electoral regime in 
Europe, socialist parties emerged as the biggest winners of the new system (Eley 2002; 




the process of capitalism, and a belief that capitalism contained the seeds of its own 
destruction. These processes would lead to a growing population of subjugated workers. 
This population would grow so large that it could successfully overthrow the current 
order and form a new society. As a result, the socialist movement believed that “their 
strength was in numbers” (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 25). If the working classes 
formed the large majority of society, then universal suffrage was akin to assuring that 
socialists could wrest political power from the bourgeoisie. The political power of 
socialist parties in the interwar period also lent credence to this assumption. In Germany, 
the SPD was the largest party, but were unable to secure a majority of votes in any 
election. This can be attributed in part to ideologically proximate parties such as the 
USPD and KPD. Even still, in Germany the average share of the total left from 1917-43 
was far below 50 percent though still respectable at 36.4 percent (Bartolini 1979). 
Socialism’s dependence preempted the possibility of socialist parties receiving a majority 
of the vote. Nowhere in Europe did the working class, however conceptualized, constitute 
fifty percent of the population (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In the face of this 
dilemma, socialist parties had to expand their voter base if they hoped to gain complete 
political power, the necessary precondition of solving the social problem according to 
their prewar programs (SPD 1891). 
Expansion of the SPD’s voter base came at a cost. “Whenever a party succeeds in 
winning the vote of one non-worker in the current election, it suffers the loss of…votes of 
workers it would have recruited during the next election” (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 
66). Przeworski and Sprague (1986) find that the cost of courting so-called “allies” by a 




“ideological and organizational transformations which continues to waken the salience of 
class identification among workers” (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 67). While the trade 
off was high for the SPD in the first years of the Weimar republic due to its 
organizational restructuring, once the communist party grew large enough to pose not just 
an organizational threat but an electoral one, the trade-off grew even steeper. Pressured 
by the KPD the SPD had to return from its supraclass strategy to a narrower class based 
strategy (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 69). Thus a spatial approach is better suited to 
explain the SPD’s positions in the second period of Weimar, when the KPD established 
itself as a credible electoral threat, as opposed to simply an organizational threat.  
The evolution of the language concerning the party’s role in transforming the 
capitalist democracy to socialist system of governance from the Görlitz Program to the 
Heidelberg Program is evident in the semantic valences of the word Klassenkampf (class 
struggle). Following Marx’s definition, class struggle is the fight of the proletariat against 
the bourgeoisie for sole control over society (Marx 1888: 1). The content of this word did 
not change much in either program, even in the Görlitz program. Part of this can be 
explained by the context. Since the Görlitz Program addressed the segments of voters to 
the right of the typical social democratic voter, what constituted the proletariat mattered 
more. The emphasis is on the negative effects of a capitalist economy that brought 
together all classes of oppressed producers rather than economic developments that lead 
to a proletarianization of large numbers of society. The Program does not treat the 
Klassenkampf as a historical necessity for the benefit of the oppressed but an aspirational 
goal for all members of society not part of the large-propertied class. The Heidelberg 




more historical materialism is expressed as the cause of the need for the class struggle. 
“The number of proletarians becomes ever larger…and the class struggle between the 
capitalist rulers of the economy and those under their domination becomes ever more 
bitter” (SPD 1925: 295).  According to the Heidelberg Program, this war can only be 
fought by the working class which grows as capitalism advances. Interestingly to note, 
and contributing to the constrained use of the phrase, by 1925 due to the KPDs emphasis 
on the class struggle the word was tied to ideas about “Bolshevist methods and ‘Russian 
conditions’” (Winkler 1982; 33). The SPD failed to reclaim the term for social 
democracy and consequently was unable to maintain its relationships with the middle 
class voters as well as capture votes from the KPD. This phenomenon reversed the usual 
dynamic in which the larger, more established party coopts the issues of the fringe party 
in order to demobilize the latter (Rosenstone et al. 1996). 
Fall of the Republic (1929-1933) 
 Over the course of the Weimar period the SPD competed in a constantly shifting 
electoral arena. Granted power in the immediate aftermath of the war and succeeding in 
pushing a number of policies in the interest of the working class, the party was committed 
to the democratic republic from the beginning. Its electoral fortunes fluctuated over the 
course of the 15-year span of the republic. From the first free democratic elections in 
1919 to the first round of elections in 1924 the party’s share of the vote decreased from 
37.9 to 20.5 percent. During this time, new, leftist parties emerged as organs of working 
class representation. The efforts of the SPD to curb the growth of these parties, in the 
form of policy and programmatic revisions, ultimately failed. In its 1924 Heidelberg 
Program the party reaffirmed its commitment to the class struggle in an attempt to appeal 




gained votes in the next two elections it never again reached the dominant position it held 
in the first elections. The tensions expressed in the two very different programs of the 
SPD prevented the party from creating any large gains in the electorate to its right or left. 
The Görlitz Program in conjunction with the active policies against the growth of rival 
leftist organizations was a failed attempt to court the voters of the left. Ultimately, the 
party was unable to seize on the militant sentiment of the working class in the first period 
of Weimar Democracy. By the time it reformulated its program in Heidelberg, it was too 
late. The positions staked out by the KPD had been so explicit that the SPD could only 
hope to play catch-up. The economic disaster of 1929 only further weakened the working 
class movement’s belief in the SPDs course of democratic socialism and in Germany had 
devastating political consequences for democracy at large (Eley 2002: 260).  
The crisis of 1929 threw an already troubled society into complete disarray. As 
the German experiment with democracy progressed it lost favorability among large 
swathes of the population. Electoral results for anti democratic parties such as the KPD 
and fatally, the NSDAP led to governmental instability. In an effort to reset the course of 
the republic the SPD joined the government once more in 1928 after nearly six years in 
opposition. However, the government’s response to the economic crisis did not appease 
the majority of the electorate and as a result in 1930 the final coalition government of 
Germany was dissolved. Though free elections were held, the governments leading up to 
Hitler’s seizure of political power in 1933 shifted the power from the parliamentary 
groups to the Reichspräsident. The appeal of the NSDAP was partly based in their social 
policies (Berman 2017: 3). In opposition to the austerity promoted by the conservative 




promoted social welfare as a means of fighting the depression. Over the course of the 
next decade the Nazi controlled government “was controlling decisions about economic 
production, investment, wages and prices” (Berman 2017: 3). While the economy 
remained capitalist, the state’s role in controlling the crisis of capital was increased to 
levels never before experienced in Germany. These benefits of course did not come 
without great cost to those sections of the population not considered deserving. 
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Chapter 4: The Federal Republic (1945-1959) 
 
As the German citizenry attempted to rebuild following the end of the war, the 
parties of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany; FRG) also 
once more faced a period of restructuring in what was a new polity. This thesis has traced 
the evolution of the German left’s positions on the system of capitalism from its origins 
during the period of imperial rule through the democratic experiment of the Weimar 
Republic. This chapter focuses on the first fifteen years of the Federal Republic, ten of 
which occurred under the watchful eyes of the occupying powers. After 1959, the 
German Left continued to compete with the CDU for the majority share of the German 
electorate. Though the party was never able to reach the high results of the CDU during 
the first elections of the FRG they eventually gained real political power as the majority 
partner in a coalition with the free democrats. Still, the period from 1945 to 1959 marks a 
unique period in the history of the German Left. In this chapter I try to explain the final 
attempt of the SPD to navigate the tensions between working in the system of democracy 
and the economic liberation of the working class through socialism. 
The parties of this period (1945-1959) established the basic structure of the 
modern German party system. Until 1956, when the major parties voted to ban the 
Communist Party, the KPD anchored the left-most position on the (one-dimensional) 
ideological spectrum. The SPD began its move away from its Marxist commitments 
towards the broad appeal of a true Volkspartei (Otto Kirchheimer 1966) during this time. 




Social Democratic Party’s electoral fortunes drastically changed. Driven by a desire to 
remain electorally viable in a much-changed political environment, the SPD staked out 
positions on the relationship between capitalism and democracy increasingly similar to 
those of the other major mass party, the interdenominational Christlich Demokratische 
Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union: CDU). As in the last chapter, 
organizational development preceded electoral considerations. I argue that from 1945 to 
1952, the SPD’s position-taking on the country’s political-economic future is best 
explained by organizational forces, not by the spatial imperatives of Downsianism. In 
particular, the chaotic circumstances in which party (re-)building occurred in devastated, 
occupied western Germany eventually produced a party dominated by a single figure 
from the Weimar period, Kurt Schumacher. Schumacher’s own normative commitments 
and views about German democracy pushed the SPD in the direction of class dominated 
politics in order to establish a new order rather than a reconstruction of prewar Germany 
(Brandt and Lehnert 2013: 166). After Schumacher’s death, the SPD, even while thriving 
in some ways, continued to stumble through the postwar period. In this period (1952-59), 
the party’s position taking reflected a clear Downsian logic, culminating in its eventual 
transformation from Marxist to Volkspartei. The organizational constraints of the first 
period ended with Schumacher’s death and a new generation of social democrats took 
over the party leadership. The 1959 Bad Godesberg Program officially broke with the 
Marxist tradition of social democracy in Germany and highlights the transformation of 
the party into the modern SPD. 
I begin the chapter with an overview of the new German polity, marked by a new 




powers. New circumstances affected the organization of the party at the national level in 
West Germany. Next, I turn to the emergence of the CDU as the strongest party in this 
new polity, and the reemergence of the SPD in this new political economic context. The 
evidence for my argument is drawn from Wahlprogramme (electoral programs) from 
both the SPD and CDU in the elections of 1949, 1953 and 1957, leading up to the revised 
Grundsatzprogramm (Basic Program) ratified at the SPD party congress at Bad 
Godesberg in 1959. I analyze the positions taken in these programs to support my 
arguments concerning the primary explanations in each of the two periods from 1945-
1952 and 1952-1959. 
The Federal Republic of Germany: 1949-1959 
The jump in time from the last chapter to this one is not accidental. During the 
years of Nazi dictatorship, by definition no opposition parties competed in elections. Still, 
the period from 1933-1945 had a profound effect on the landscape of political 
competition in postwar Germany. In part driven by the desire to prevent further German 
aggression, the allied powers occupied the “new” Germany (Fullbrook 2004). After the 
war, Germany’s borders excluded numerous of the territories held by the Nazis and some 
that had been part of the nation prior to the establishment of the Third Reich. The allies 
split the territories contained within these new borders into four zones of occupation. 
Britain, France and the United States controlled the western territories while Russia ruled 
alone in the Eastern territories. 
The allies’ decision to split the German territories had a twofold effect on the 
electoral strategies of parties. Operating within a new polity, the parties faced new rules 




as passive in forming the political direction of postwar Germany as others (Pulzer 1995: 
50). While universal suffrage had already been a feature of the Weimar Constitution, the 
electorate was split along the east-west lines. Only those residing in the Western zones 
could vote for Western parties. Some of the electoral strongholds of the Left during the 
Weimar Republic were now under Russian control (Lehnert and Ebert 2013). In the 
West, the British were the first to give the Germans some leeway in rebuilding their 
society (Orlow 2008: 250). With this freedom, the Parties started to reorganize 
themselves with one clear restriction: no Nazi or similar parties were allowed to form. In 
an effort to avoid the fragmented party system that plagued Weimar the allies, prior to the 
ratification of the Basic Law, only allowed a four-party system to exist. The first 
instances of party competition in this new system were at the state level of Länder 
elections. The parties had an opportunity to operate above these local levels for the first 
time in 1947, following the establishment of an economic council to oversee the 
combined British and American zones (Pothoff and Miller, 2006). The Western allies 
continued to cooperate and support the political reconstitution of West Germany; in 1949, 
the West German states ratified the new Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and the FRG was born. 
New Rules of the Game 
The Nazi dictatorship left an imprint on German politics that was institutionalized 
in the country’s provisional constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of 1949. A 
parliamentary council consisting of representatives from the German Länder in 
proportion to their electoral success, was tasked with drafting the new rules of the game. 
The SDP and CDU each received 27 seats under these distributive rules (Pulzer 1995: 45) 
Additionally the emphasis on the representation of Länder already demonstrated their 




Hitler’s rise in part on the Prussian tradition of a highly powerful, centralized state and 
thus preferred decentralization (Judt 2005: 265). Additionally the process of electing the 
Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament, for the first relied on the votes of the people 
rather than the appointment of royalists during the Empire and state parliaments during 
Weimar.  
It is often argued that the Weimar constitution allowed the Nazis to rise to power 
(Orlow 2008; Pulzer 1995). The extremely proportional system of distributing seats in 
parliament gave fringe parties easy entrance into the national assembly combined with 
outsize role of the Reichspräsident, especially in a state of emergency, certainly 
contributed to the Nazi’s seizure of political power. In order to prevent a repeat of the 
failures of the Weimar Constitution, certain provisions were put in place to negate the 
possibility of a highly fragmented political system and the misuse of emergency powers. 
One of the most obvious differences with the Weimar constitution was that the power of 
the president was greatly weakened. As opposed to the Weimar president, the new 
Bundespräsident did not have emergency powers granted to him as in article 48 of the 
Weimar constitution (Orlow 2008: 262). Hitler had used these emergency powers to 
silence political opponents when he became chancellor.  
In order to make it more difficult for splinter parties to attain seats in parliament, 
five percent of the national vote was required to receive any seats. This so-called fünf 
Prozent Hürde (five percent hurdle) was instituted in reaction to Weimar’s political 
landscape, in which small parties such as the Nazis were able to gain representation, and 




of no confidence” in order to reduce the likelihood of cabinet crises that allowed parties 
like the Nazis to overthrow governments with ease (Orlow 2008: 263).  
The New Electorate 
In addition to the new rules inscribed in the Basic Law, the electorate for which 
the parties competed was fundamentally different than that of the Weimar Republic. 
Though the population of the Western zones was only slightly less than the population of 
the Weimar Republic, its composition and geographical location was drastically different. 
Millions of Germans, particularly male, lost their lives during the Second World War, 
which skewed the population of potential voters. The division of the German territories 
also impacted the SPD’s electoral potential. Industrial strongholds East of the Oder that 
had been in the hands of social democrats before the war were now in the Soviet Zone 
(Judt 2005: 267). The electorate that existed within the Western Zones included a large 
number of conservative voters. These especially coalesced around the Christian Social 
Union in the southern state of Bavaria. In fact, more than half of western Germany was 
Catholic and the Christian Democratic Union appealed to these voters more than the anti-
clerical SPD (Judt 2005: 267). These demographic realities coupled with the growing 
left-right polarization during the beginnings of the Cold War meant that by 1949 the 
German electorate was far less willing to listen to leftist solutions to economic problems. 
The Economic Miracle (1949-1960) 
In the aftermath of the Second World War the German Government, with the help 
of the occupying powers instituted numerous policy measures to reconstruct the German 
Economy. The first step taken to bolster the economy was a currency reform that took the 
old Reichsmark out of circulation and replaced it with the Deutsche Mark. The second 




Together with Ludwig Erhardt’s economic policy, these two factors aided the German 
economy in making a striking recovery through the 1950s. The economy grew and even 
surpassed the growth rates of many of the advanced economies in Europe. The high 
unemployment due to an influx of labor from refugees and former prisoners of war in the 
mid- to late 1940s turned into a labor shortage by the end of the 1950s (Fullbrook, 2004).  
The CDU presided over this period of economic productivity referred to as the 
Wirtschaftswunder (Economic Miracle). The Minister of the Economy, Ludwig Erhardt, 
played a major role in promoting the so-called Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market 
economy). This model was based in “Ordo-liberal” notions of the relationship between 
the state and the market. Ordo-liberalism was conceived in the waning years of the Nazi 
regime and, as opposed to classical liberalism, promoted an aggressive involvement of 
the state in securing the efficiency of markets (Starbatty 1988; Grosskettler 1994). This 
was translated into CDU policies such as substantial socialization of the economy. 
Notably, almost half of all production of coal and iron and a majority of German banks 
were owned or controlled by the state (Judt 2005: 266). Additionally, a policy of 
Mitbestimmung (Co-Determination) required large firms to include workers as real 
players in their governance. The social aspect of the social market economy was a 
commitment to protecting the lower classes of society. As opposed to the Marxist theory 
espoused by the SPD to appeal to the exploited classes, in the hands of the CDU this 
commitment was rooted in the ideals of Christian morality (Kalyvas 1996: 2). Taken 
together these reforms undermined the support for Marxist solutions to economic issues 




CDU Success and SPD Response 
In 1955, the occupation statutes lapsed and Germany became a self-sufficient 
democracy. In 1957 in the first elections following the de-occupation of West Germany 
the CDU won an absolute majority of the votes, a feat that has not been repeated by any 
party since (Fullbrook 2004: 213). The electoral support for the CDU came in part from 
its appeal to the large proportion of German Catholics residing in the western Zones as 
well as their success with rural, small town voters and employers. Allied trust in church 
institution further favored the CDU in federal elections (Pulzer 1995: 52). Though the 
SPD gained a respectable 31.8 percent of the vote, their highest totals of the postwar 
elections, the leadership recognized the success of the CDU as a defeat of the SPD as it 
existed at that time. At the federal level the SPD became “the chief victims of the CDU’s 
success” (Judt 2005: 267). 
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), formed as a new conservative party with 
anti-Nazi roots. Although the party occupied the ideological space taken up by the 
Weimar Zentrum Party—the representative organ of the conservative Catholics—it 
wanted to reestablish itself as an interdenominational party rather than solely appealing to 
German Catholics (Fullbrook 2004: 209). In the West, the head of this party was Konrad 
Adenauer, “der Alte,” mayor of Cologne. Adenauer was an established conservative who 
was also an ardent antifascist. He had the support of the allied powers due to his positions 
on German integration into Western Europe and anti-communist stances (Pulzer 1995: 
56) He became the first chancellor of the FRG, having already played a major role in the 
drafting of the Basic Law. 
 The electoral success of the CDU came as a blow to the postwar social democracy 




than the Social Democrats” (Pulzer 1995: 51). The SPD hoped to cash in on an anti Nazi 
track record dating back to the final elections of the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, the 
war and its destructive effects on the German economy erased much of the wealth held 
by German citizens. However, neither of these realities translated into the successes the 
SPD hoped for. Instead the German population equated the SPD with the failures of the 
parliamentary democracy during the Weimar Republic and believed in an upward 
trajectory of their economic misfortunes (Pulzer 1995: 52). Especially the postwar leader 
of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, remained convinced that greatest chances for German 
resurgence remained in the socialism. 
 Schumacher’s credentials as successor to the chancellorship rivaled those of 
Konrad Adenauer. Schumacher, who had fought in World War One and served as a 
member of the Reichstag, where he openly opposed the National Socialist program, was 
part of the next generation of social democrats after the Ebert generation (Walter 2009: 
123). Schumacher was elected leader of the SPD in West Germany in part thanks to this 
record; many in his party considered him a heroic figure (Judt 2005: 269). He was one of 
the few prominent members of the SPD that had remained in Germany during the War 
though for nearly ten years he was interned in concentration camps. All this gave him 
enormous prestige with the voters, independent of his political views (Walter 2009: 125). 
Schumacher began reorganizing the SPD as early as 1945 and organized a congress of 
SPD representatives from each of the Western Zones where he was elected party leader 
(Ebert and Lehnert 2013: 165). 
 Schumacher’s leadership of the SPD has been likened to the authoritarian 




Lehnert 2013; Walter 2009). Schumacher was granted a relatively large amount of 
leeway by other party leaders and especially by the almost “cultish” following he 
controlled in the party membership (Walter 2009: 123). As a result, Schumacher’s own 
beliefs became the core of SPD positions during his time at in control of the party. 
Importantly he believed that the reunification of Germany was closer at hand than may 
have been suggested. As a result he opposed the integration of West Germany into both 
Western Europe as well as the international community (Pulzer 1995:56). These positions 
placed the SPD in direct opposition to the positions of the CDU and contributed to the 
allies’ mistrust of him. In other words, Schumacher was more willing than others to 
accept a smaller probability of electoral victory in exchange for the ability to build party 
positions consistent with his own beliefs. His strong hold on the party direction during his 
time as leader, forced the organization “almost completely to the fringes” of the German 
Federal Republic (Walter 2009: 126). 
1949 Elections 
Schumacher’s positions on the economy and prospects of socialism are reflected 
in the SPD’s 1949 electoral program. This program was still very much rooted in the 
Marxism that guided the language of the party’s Weimar Programs. Economic Planning 
was the central economic policy promoted by the party (SPD 1949). The program 
included calls to “nationalize large industries, credit institutions as well as insurance 
companies” (SPD 1949: 2). The party justifies these demands by stating, that 
“Socialization is the best protection of freedom and democracy” (SPD 1949: 2). These 
demands reflected those of a radical Marxist party that is concerned more with appealing 
to an already social democratic section of the population than with electoral victory. 




positions on the necessity of socialist political action to ensure the future of the German 
state. He was uncompromising in the face of CDU policy proposals viewing socialism as 
the only solution to the reestablishment of Germany (Walter 2009: 126). However, and 
problematically for the SPD’s electoral fortunes, the SPD “had nothing practical to offer” 
in the place of the CDU’s policies. Schumacher guided the party back to its “traditional 
socialist program of nationalizations and social guarantees” (Judt 2005: 268). 
1953 Elections 
The relative electoral salience of traditional socialist positions on democracy and 
capitalism, at least for the Social Democrats, seems to have waned between the 1949 and 
1953 elections. This can be attributed in part to Schumacher’s death in 1952. Still, the 
SPD’s 1953 party continued to affirm its Marxist positions. The party viewed democracy 
in the hands of the Christian Democrats with skepticism. “Together with political 
democracy, must come the democratization of the economy, which we understand as the 
right to co-determination by the workforce in the economy” (SPD 1953: 6). Additionally, 
the role of social policy must be transformative of all of society, and thereby 
preventative, as opposed to providing piecemeal support for individual members of 
society. It “should not only clean up after the grossest damages of the ruling system; it 
requires a foundational change of this system itself” (SPD 1953: 7). These statements 
show a party still mistrustful of the processes of modern German democracy. Even after 
Schumacher’s death his beliefs in the need for complete power of the SPD in order to 
ensure social equality remained entrenched in the party’s positions. This was due to the 
actions of his immediate successor, Erich Ollenhauer, who “eschewed every deviation 




Following the successes of the CDU in 1949, the SPD discussed the issue of the 
economy in terms of the dominant system, the social market economy. Many of the basic 
principles of the social market economy dealt with the very issues that the SPD stood for. 
In fact, the social market economy allowed for “planned influencing of the economy by 
the organic means of economic policy” (CDU 1949: 61). While, the CDU was 
encroaching on the SPD positions of state control of the economy, at least to an extent 
organizational fetters kept the SPD from making strategic moves to counter these 
positions. The program qualified the social market economy as the “so-called social 
market economy” (SPD 1953: 7). Even while this system of economic governance was 
helping those members of society that the SPD should have cared the most about, the 
working-classes, the party firmly held to an oppositional course of action promoted by 
Schumacher. 
1957 Elections 
 It is important to note, here, that Communist Parties were banned in the Federal 
Republic between the 1953 and 1957 elections. The KPD did exist as the representatives 
of communism in the FRG and in the first elections won over five percent of the vote, 
securing them 15 seats in the Reichstag. However, the party’s electoral successes 
dwindled due to internal struggles and their support of the Soviet Blockade of West 
Berlin (Orlow 2008). In the 1953 elections, the party failed to clear the five percent 
hurdle and was not represented in the parliament. The government dissolved the 
Communist party in 1956, appealing to the language of the Basic Law that outlawed the 
anti-system parties that had plagued the party system of the Weimar Republic. As a 




Weimar did not apply to the party in the Federal Republic. Consequently, the SPD had 
more space to maneuver and establish itself as a reformist mass party without fear of 
losing their more militant voters. However, the electoral program of 1957 and the 
electoral results of this election do not support a view of a party keen on changing its 
positions in order to capture the newly unrepresented voters.  
Even by 1957, five years after Schumacher’s death, the SPD continued on the 
course set by its charismatic leader to its electoral demise. Large organizations such as 
political parties take time to change and it took a decade of increasingly devastating 
electoral losses for the party to finally reassess the positions taken in its Basic Program. 
From the outset the SPD’s 1957 electoral program committed itself to Schumacher’s 
naïve view that unification was imminent. It blames Adenauer and the CDU for failing in 
the project of reunification (SPD 1957: 148). Furthermore, the party expressly condemns 
the “economic miracle” for providing a “small stratum with large fortunes” (SPD 1957: 
149). Still, in its economic section the party approaches a desire to act within the existing 
system rather than abolishing it.  
The Marxist positions of Schumacher and his generation began to dissolve into 
pragmatic proposals of restructuring the German economy for the benefit of the working 
class. The SPD methods for promoting social equality were regulations of prices and 
taxes. Already the favorable view of economic planning that permeated the first post-war 
SPD programs had been eradicated from the 1957 document. The party stated, that 
“wealth and income accumulation must be formed more equally” (SPD 1957: 149). This 
language does not sound like the Marxist party of the pre-war period that demanded the 




(SPD 1925). Ultimately, these hesitant moves towards a more lenient view of capitalist 
democracy were not enough to increase the SPD’s electoral appeal. Instead, the party lost 
to the CDU by the larges margin thus far, nearly 20 percent (Walter 2009: 136). This 
electoral defeat would motivate the new leadership to measure the party’s success by 
electoral results rather than its firm commitment to prewar principles. 
The Road to Bad Godesberg 
 The second half of the 1950s was a period of rapidly changing political context 
across Europe. The Cold War started to have a greater impact on German foreign policy, 
marked by their entrance into NATO in 1955 and growing support for European 
integration resulting in the FRG joining the European Economic Community (EEC) as a 
founding member. Schumacher had opposed both of these foreign policy positions to the 
detriment of the party’s popularity (Judt 2005: 268). Additionally, the prospects for 
unification in the near term seemed far lower than Schumacher had hoped. The CDU 
government had also banned the KPD in 1955, which sent a clear message to the SPD 
leadership that any flirtations with communism would come at a detriment to the party’s 
political success. With his passing in 1952 his firm positions on these issues as expressed 
in electoral program slowly receded. “A new generation of German Socialists” emerged 
to take control of the party (Judt 2005: 268). This generation included more pragmatic 
leaders of local sections of the party. They had their formative experiences with social 
democracy in Scandinavia, England and the US during the War (Pulzer 1995: 70). Some, 
such as Willy Brandt, had also held mayoral positions during the years of Schumacher’s 
rule as opposed to national roles where they would have had to act closer to the party 
line. The benefits of the Social Market Economy also had an effect on the potential 




The 1957 election results showed the power of Adenauer and the CDU as the 
party and its chancellor achieved an unheard absolute majority in parliament. The SPD 
was forced to reassess its positions following this massive electoral defeat (Sassoon 1996: 
241). The new generation of SPD leaders “reformulated the party’s principles in a way 
that increasingly corresponded with its practice” at the level of the Länder (Pulzer 1995: 
70). The revisions to party doctrine were an attempt to strengthen the party’s chances of 
surviving in the new electoral circumstances. The leadership expected that it “would be 
more than amply compensated” by making these changes. A break with its Marxist 
theoretical underpinnings would enable the party to exhibit more strategic flexibility, and 
increase the party’s electoral appeal and ability to find political allies” (Sassoon 1996: 
242).  
The Bad Godesberg Program 
 
“This is the contradiction of our time…that humanity developed the productive forces to 
the utmost, accumulated colossal riches, without providing everyone an equal portion of 
this collective accomplishment” 
The Bad Godesberg Program (1959) 
The notion of an unequal distribution of riches features as a central concern of the 
Godesberg Program. In fact, the above quote is the second sentence of the program.1 We 
have seen the issue of economic inequality occupy various levels of saliency in the basic 
programs of the SPD. However, in no other program does the party take such a broad 
stance on the issue. Whereas previously the inequalities existed between the exploiter and 
the exploited, the capitalist or landowner and the worker, this quote is not explicitly about 
a struggle between two opposing economic camps. Instead, it appeals to a broad audience 
with words such as “humanity” and “everyone” taking the place of the class-specific 
                                                




language so central to previous programs. In fact, this quote does not even mention 
capitalism as a cause of these inequalities; instead “humanity” has “accumulated colossal 
riches” and has not provided for everyone. The SPD no longer needs to advocate for the 
democratization of the economy as democracy alone can now provide for the proper 
governance of humanity at large. The tensions between democracy and social equality 
have all but disappeared. 
 The Godesberg Program represents a culmination of an evolution of the social 
democratic party from 1875-1959. What was once a party solely concerned with the 
liberation of a class of society brought together by purely material interests now 
conceptualizes itself as “the party of freedom of thought. It is a community of men 
holding different beliefs and ideas” (SPD 1953: 1). Ideological diversity replaces the 
earlier dogmatism of Marxism. This ideological openness allows the party to reformulate 
its relationship to both democracy and capitalism. While the tensions between the two 
systems occupied much of the SPDs previous programmatic documents the Bad 
Godesberg program no longer places this as a central tenet of democratic socialism. In 
fact, the first tenet of this program is about international relations not economic justice, 
which is of secondary importance and is approached as a problem of “equal opportunity.” 
This commitment forms the basis of the party’s economic policy the goal of which is “the 
constant growth of prosperity and a just share for all in the national product” (SPD 1959: 
8). In order to accomplish this “the SPD affirms its adherence to democracy” (SPD 1959: 





 As recently as in the party’s 1946 statement on the Political Principles of the 
Social Democratic Party, democracy is “constantly under threat in a capitalist system” 
(SPD 1946: 3). In 1959 the party has completely accepted the processes of capitalism as 
beneficial to the large mass of society. “The Second Industrial Revolution makes possible 
a rise in the general standard of living greater than ever before and the elimination of 
poverty and misery still suffered by large numbers of people” (SPD 1959: 8). The 
economic policies, to which the party commits itself, no longer, require the expropriation 
of large landowners or even the owners of the means of production. In fact, the program 
goes so far as to say, that “private ownership of the means of production can claim 
protection by society as long as it does not hinder the establishment of social justice” 
(SPD 1959: 9). Far from a tension between economic or social justice and the process of 
capitalism the party believes that the two can coexist. 
 A complete repudiation of the party ideology as inscribed in the Heidelberg 
Program 34 years earlier would have lost the party any credibility with the voters. The 
party justifies its programmatic changes with a historical section to end the program. It 
recounts the massive victories that the labor movement has made for the working class. 
“The proletarian who was once without protection and rights, who had to work sixteen 
hours a day for a starvation wage, achieved the eight-hour day, protection at work, 
insurance against unemployment, sickness, disability and destitution in old age” (SPD 
1959: 19). These gains are the basis for the party’s belief that “Once a mere object of 
exploitation, the worker now occupies the position of a citizen in the state with equal 
rights and obligations” (SPD 1959: 19). Since the longtime sole object of the party, the 




based policies to proposals that benefit all of society. The party that blamed the processes 
of capitalism for the “increase in the insecurity of [the proletariat’s] existence, of misery, 
of pressure, of oppression, of degradation, of exploitation” (SPD 1891: 81) has, 68 years 
later, reconciled the tensions between that system and their role within it as a democratic 
political party. 
 This chapter only spanned15 years yet the positions of the SPD changed so much 
as to lead to a reconceptualization of the party as a fully evolved catch-all party. The 
organizational changes established at the Godesberg Congress, set parameters for the 
party competition in until reunification in 1989 and beyond. The organizational approach 
carries real explanatory weight during this period. Kurt Schumacher’s role, as leader of 
the party, in this process cannot be understated. His normative ideas of what social 
democracy should look like and how it should act were expressed in the positions of the 
party’s electoral programs during the period from 1945-1959. Even after his death his 
firm beliefs about the role of internationalism and opposition took external shocks to 
revise. Schumacher’s strategies did not pay off electorally; the SPD was crushed in the 
1957 elections and faced a crisis of survival. The new generation of SPD leaders that took 
control of the party in the years immediately after the1957 elections had had different 
experiences with socialism within capitalism than Schumacher and his cohort. The 
resulting shifts in organizational leadership are reflected in the Godesberg Program. 
Electoral pragmatism took precedence over principled opposition. The question of how to 
reconcile socialism to modern democracy within a capitalist system, and whether such a 
reconciliation was even possible, was finally answered for the SPD in 1959. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
“The 1960s brought generations of young people with different needs and desires, 
constructing their own understandings of personhood citizenship and the future…Their 
new personal and material circumstances coincided with capitalist restructuring and 
long range social changes during the last third of the twentieth century, and this new 
conjuncture destroyed the environment the socialist tradition had need in order to grow.” 
–Eley 2002 
The Godesberg Program marked a decisive moment in the evolution of SDP 
positions on the tensions between capitalism and democracy. During the 30 years from 
the publication of the Godesberg Program to the reunification of East and West Germany 
into unified Germany in 1989, the German political system established itself as a modern 
parliamentary democracy. During this period of democracy, the longest in German 
history, the importance and stability of traditional ideologies of left right slowly moved to 
the background of electoral politics (Sasoon 1996; Eley 2002; Walter 2009). The period 
of expansive growth following the restructuring of German society after the end of the 
Second World War allowed citizens to feel relatively materially secure. Consequently, 
citizens’ values shifted from a material emphasis, such as class based values, to a post-
materialist view. Post-materialism finds value outside of physical and economic safety; 
instead values such as self-expression and quality of life are paramount (Inglehart 1981). 
The clearest expression of this value-shift can be found in the 1968 movements across 
Europe. 
 Where the 1950s showed a movement away from a socialist ideology opposed to 
capitalism as evidenced by the Godesberg Program, the 1960s were a period of increased 
anti-establishment culture (Sasoon 1996). Simultaneously, the old Marxism that had been 




new intellectual form of Marxism stemming from contemporary French and German 
interpretations of Marx’s theory. It was in this new political climate that the SPD played a 
part in German government for the first time since the end of the Second World War. In 
1966 the CDU/CSU and FDP government fell apart over economic issues. In the wake of 
the dissolution of government the SPD and CDU/CSU came together to form the first 
“Grand Coalition” of the Federal Republic (Ebert and Lehnert 2013: 194). The parties 
ruled together until 1969 when the SPD formed its first government as senior partner 
together with the FDP. Under the leadership of Willy Brandt, the charismatic mayor of 
Berlin, the party was able to remain in power for three election cycles until 1982. During 
this time foreign policy in the form of Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) took the center 
stage of the SPD’s role as governing party (Potthoff and Miller 2006: 231). However, his 
tenure as Bundeskanzler was not merely marked by his foreign policy. Domestically he 
increased social services such as social insurance as well as unemployment benefits 
(Pothoff and Miller 2006: 265). 
 The efforts of the SPD to stabilize the relationship between East and West 
Germany helped move the country toward reunification. Throughout the 1980s as the 
Soviet Union relaxed its authoritarian policies numerous occupied countries began to 
clamor for independence. Following, the breakdown of borders between occupied and 
unoccupied zones East German citizens began a mass exodus to the West. After weeks of 
civil unrest and numerous protests in major East German cities, on the 9th of November 
1989 after a press conference broadcasted to the East German population the government 
of East Germany declared that the borders between East and West would be opened. In 




on the constitution of a reunited Germany (Orlow 2008: Ch. 10). The Basic Law of West 
Germany became the constitution of the reunited German Republic. This new nation 
established the fourth German polity since unification in 1871.  
This thesis has discussed party position taking in three separate polities, each 
marked by a distinct form of government and economic contexts. Two World Wars 
separate the polities taken under consideration. In each period distinct features of the 
political and social systems interacted to create an environment where unique 
explanations provided a basis for understanding the position taking of German parties of 
the Left on the issue of economic inequality. The constant measure of German leftist 
political success remains the Social Democratic Party. As a party founded in the Marxist 
tradition of Karl Kautsky and August Bebel the ideational explanation that underlies the 
first two SPD programs, more evident in the Erfurt Program than the Gotha Program, is 
the strongest way of understanding the parties evolution over its long and fragmented 
history. Once the unification of German socialist parties was accomplished, the ideas that 
would provide the benchmark for party position taking became paramount.  
The ideational tensions between revisionism and militancy manifested themselves 
during the Weimar Republic and led to the eventual organization of opposition parties on 
the Left. During this time of burgeoning democracy, all political parties were facing a 
brand new environment of electoral competition. Economic crises as well as social unrest 
spurred the parties to stake out positions on issues other than simply working-class 
politics. As Anti-democratic parties emerged on all sides of the ideological spectrum, 
including the left, the SPD organized to slow the growth of these parties. This 




of unequal circumstances and democracies attempts to fix these. However, the positions 
of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) to the left of the SPD, in particular proved to 
place the greatest electoral pressure on the SPD. Consequently, the SPD was forced to 
shift its positions on capitalism and democracy, not due to organizational restructuring as 
was the case in the early years of the Weimar Republic but due to the exit opportunities 
provided to left-wing voters of the SPD by the KPD. The fight between proponents and 
opponents of democracy destabilized this fledgling republic and led to the complete 
collapse of democracy into dictatorship in the early 1930s.  
Following the period of Nazi dictatorship both the SPD and KPD returned to 
German politics and attempted to establish themselves as the voice of the Left. However, 
the strength of the conservative CDU/CSU and general anti-communist sentiment forced 
the SPD once more to reconsider its ideological legacy. The autocratic leadership of Kurt 
Schumacher kept the party from reacting to the new political context. In 1959 the party 
published its Godesberg Program, signaling a shift from the Marxist orthodoxy that had 
provided the foundation for German Leftist politics since 1871. 
Party Evolution 
Who belonged to the working class and how they could be organized into a 
political force were at the center of socialist politics in the 19th century. In Germany two 
parties the ADAV and SAPD formed with the intention of addressing these questions. 
The result of this two party approach was a division in the working class vote between 
the two parties. Consequently neither party proved to be a significant threat to the 
established parties in the German Empire. The restrictive system of a parliamentary 
monarchy further weakened the political power of the working class. In order to address 




based in the contemporary interpretations of Marx’s political theory. The Erfurt program 
(1891) exemplified the tensions between theory and practice in this tradition. 
Theoretically based in a deterministic view of the progress of society the Erfurt Program 
evinced a belief in the victory of socialism over capitalism. Practically, it promoted 
policies to reform the system of government. Democracy was the necessary political 
system to liberate the working class. Only in democracy, with universal enfranchisement, 
could the ever growing proletariat gain the necessary political power to overthrow the 
capitalist system. Since this system was built on inequality equality in any form, social or 
economic, were only possible in the aftermath. However, already at this point the 
program called for reforms in the realm of social welfare and a fair distribution of the tax 
burden. 
As Germany transitioned from a monarchy to a democracy following the First 
World War, the German Left gained new opportunities to advocate for their 
conceptualization of a just and equal society. However, economic crisis, revolutionary 
upheaval and organizational strife restricted the extent to which socialism in the form 
established in the pre war Programs was able to achieve its goals. As a sign of the 
complex political environment that existed during the Weimar Republic, the SPD 
published to fundamentally different party programs within a five-year span. As the 
franchise was expanded and new voters became politicized across the ideological 
spectrum. Simultaneously, new parties emerged to compete for the votes of the German 
population. On the left the Communist party proved to be the most relevant newcomer. 
The KPD established itself to the left of the SPD in its Spartacus Program (1918). As an 




constituents while still advocating for a democratic state as the basis of socialism. The 
first SPD program reflected both the leadership’s as well as the core membership’s shift 
towards the center as the left wing members founded and joined new organizations to the 
left of the SPD. This internal shift was addressed by the absorption of the USPD into the 
SPD. Following this reunification the revitalized SPD turned its eye once more towards 
the threat of the KPD. As a result, in its 1925 Heidelberg Program the SPD was forced to 
change some of its stances on the solution to economic inequality it had staked out only 
four years earlier in the Görlitz Program. However, even this updated program was not 
enough to unite the working class under the SPD banner. Growing anti-democratic 
sentiment pushed many potential SPD voters to cast their ballots for the KPD and 
eventually the NSDAP. By the last years of the Weimar Republic no parties in the 
Bundestag could form a majority pro-democratic coalition thus creating the space for the 
Nazi Party to seize power and eventually for Hitler to proclaim himself dictator. 
Though the Nazi dictatorship had a profound effect on the world at Large, its 
effect on German politics following the end of World War Two was enshrined in the 
resulting party system. The provisions in the constitution to counter a repeated rise of 
anti-system and fringe parties promoted a two party system with a smaller third party 
often holding the balance of power. The SPD struggled during the early years of the 
Federal Republic never quite reaching the electoral success of the Christian Democratic 
party. The party’s positions mirrored those of its leader Kurt Schumacher and his ties to 
the Weimar SPD. Schumacher’s mistrust of capitalist democracy and false predictions 
about the future of the German state led to positions that resulted in devastating electoral 




opposition he had set. It took another seven years, during which time the government’s 
ban on communist parties in West Germany in 1956 unfettered the SPD from the left 
pressure of the KPD, as well as definite evidence of capitalisms ability to produce a better 
standard of living for all of German society, to complete the process of revising the SPD 
party Program. The SPD began to shift its long held positions on democracy and 
capitalism towards the center, and called on new values other than Marxism to appeal to a 
broader basis of the electorate. The Bad Godesberg Program (1959) is the culmination of 
these shifts and the official break of the German left with the theories of Marxism and the 
resulting belief in the inherent inequalities of capitalism. Instead the party focused on 
alleviating the plight of the working class through the tools of the capitalist economy in 
the form of a mixed economy rather than total nationalization. Thus 1959 marks the end 
of the final period of this thesis. 
The processes of party change are worth studying. In order to understand the 
direction of government and with it a fundamental part of the history of Germany we 
must understand what collective actors such as parties express as their goals. Party 
programs, as the expression of party self-identification, provide the ideal starting point. 
Still, they are merely the top most level of the expression of a myriad of underlying and 
shifting circumstances. A closer look at the organizational structures of the SPD and the 
processes of ratifying a program fell outside of the scope of this project. Additionally, 
there are numerous themes that are merely touched upon in the course of this thesis that 
warrant further exploration. The distinct role played by party theorists throughout the 
periods appears to change from nearly complete control over the party doctrine in the 




individual interaction between party theorists and party programs could shed more light 
on the explanations of the content of these programs. In the organizational realm a deeper 
interrogation of party structure at certain points in time could provide insight into the 
processes inhibiting certain ideas to enter the final editions of party literature.  
Current research on manifesto data exists in a much more comparative space 
where motivation is less important than expression. However, as this thesis has shown it 
is not enough to simply take the programs at face value or an expression of what the party 
views as the problems of the time. The way that parties discuss issues such as economic 
inequality is not simply the effect of an unequal society. Though the issue may become 
more salient during a period of extreme inequality, the way in which it is discussed 
depends on a myriad of interacting contexts. I have made a case for certain readings of 
the programmatic literature provided by the Left. In weighing the ideational, 
organizational and positional explanations of the language surrounding the issue of 
economic inequality I hope to contribute to a debate about political parties both in their 
role as constructors of the political space and their interaction with the space they see as 
existing. 
The evolution of Social Democratic party positions on the tensions between 
democracy and capitalism as described here are specific to the German SPD. However, 
we can learn some things for further investigation into party position taking. The 
approaches taken here may not work well in explaining right wing tensions, in part 
because the issues at hand would not play such a major role in the programmatic 
language of these parties as they may be more inclined to accept the processes of 




the European left are not so analogous. Germany is a particular case that experienced 
major shifts in their political economic context that provided unique contexts for the 
social democratic politics to evolve. Still, as we have seen the approaches used in this 
thesis can shed light on the party position taking in other polities. An organizational 
explanation often had primary explanatory power in immediate postwar contexts, where 
the political system had to be rebuilt. In both Weimar and the Federal Republic this 
explanation was followed by a spatial explanation. This two-pronged approach could 
work for parties generally. Given the leveling effects of war and a fresh political 
environment to compete in, parties must first and foremost be concerned with their 
internal organization before they are able to worry about their electoral fortunes. After the 
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